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THE EXTRAORDINARY  persistence of price inflation in the face of mild 
and then severe recession over the last several years has suggested  a 
momentum  in wages and prices. Once inflation  has become the pattern, 
it is very hard  to eliminate.  One view of this momentum  is that the his- 
torical experience  of rising wages and prices creates the expectation  of 
further  inflation;  and,  because  firms  and  workers  expect  prices  and  wages 
to rise, they do rise. Provided monetary-fiscal  policy is accommodative, 
these  expectations  are fully realized  and  the inflation  continues.  Another, 
and not entirely  distinct,  view holds that firms  set wages and prices  rela- 
tive to other wages and prices. The inflation  continues  not so much be- 
cause of expectations,  but because  firms  and  workers  constantly  perceive 
themselves  as just  catching  up with  past  inflation. 
There  is broad agreement  that refusing  to provide  fiscal-monetary  ac- 
commodation  will eventually  end an inflationary  process.  Whether  mon- 
etary  or fiscal  restraint  is the tool is not an issue here. In either  case, the 
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result  is a period  of recession,  of underutilized  labor and capital.  In par- 
ticular,  the unemployment  rate will exceed for a period the rate some- 
times  called  "natural,"  but more  appropriately  called  the nonaccelerating- 
inflation rate of  unemployment  (NAIRU)  since this rate is  neither 
"natural"  nor optimal.  The momentum  of inflation  is a particularly  severe 
problem  for the macroeconomic  policymaker  because halting it by re- 
straining  aggregate  demand  becomes  so very costly.  Why  a severe  or pro- 
longed  recession  seems  necessary  to halt inflation  has long been a central 
issue of macroeconomic  theory  and poses the main dilemma  of current 
macroeconomic policy. 
This paper will consider  certain aspects of this question,  but before 
summarizing  the main  ideas, it is worth  clarifying  the viewpoint  that will 
be taken  on two controversial  issues.  The first  concerns  the sharp  disagree- 
ment about the chain of causality  by which monetary  or fiscal restraint 
eventually  slows  inflation.  One  hypothesis  asserts  that  policy  changes  have 
a direct impact on real aggregate  demand,  which, in turn, has a direct 
impact  on real aggregate  output  and on employment.  Given  an initial  fall 
in demand,  unemployment  will rise above  the NAIRU and then  the rates 
of wage and price  inflation  will decline.  An alternative  hypothesis  is that 
changes  in policy have a direct  impact  on prices,  affecting  output,  either 
because  of short-run  money illusion or, equivalently,  because  the actual 
and the expected  price levels diverge.  It is not clear which, if either,  of 
these  views  should  be labeled  "Keynesian"  or "classical."  Keynes  assumed 
a type of money illusion' and so do many  modern  textbooks.  But errors 
in the perception  of the  price  level are  a feature  of the  new  classical  macro- 
economics,  allowing  such  models  to display  "'Keynesian'  short-run  prop- 
erties."72  Many  of the arguments  made  in this paper  apply  in either  frame- 
work,  but at various  points it will be assumed  that the causal  chain runs 
from  policy to real output  to wages  and  prices.3 
The second  controversial  issue concerns  the way in which expectations 
1. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of  Employment, Interest and 
Money (London: Macmillan, 1936), especially book 5. 
2.  Thomas J. Sargent, "A Classical Macroeconometric Model for  the United 
States,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (April 1976), p. 235. 
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appropriate  countercyclical  movement; and (2)  that the profit-maximizing  output of 
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are formed.  The new classical  models assume  rational  expectations,  en- 
suring  that any Keynesian  properties  they have indeed apply  only to the 
short  run.  The  assumption  also means  that  only  unexpected  policy  changes 
or exogenous  shocks will cause actual prices to deviate from expected 
ones and hence cause an unemployment  rate different  from the NAIRU. 
It is possible,  however,  to accept  the assumption  of rational  expectations 
and reject  other assumptions  of the new classical  models. In fact, many 
of the contract-theory  models built by myself and by others  assume ra- 
tional expectations.  However, the assumption  of rational  expectations, 
while convenient  analytically,  is probably  at best only an approximation 
to the rather casual way in which people actually form expectations, 
heavily influenced  by their own direct experience.  As a result, different 
groups  may hold very different  expectations.  This paper at times makes 
assumptions  inconsistent  with the usual statements  of rational expecta- 
tions.  However,  the implications  of more  "rationality"  will be considered, 
as well as whether  the label is always  being correctly  applied.4 
Two related  ideas will be presented.  First,  it will  be argued  that  a world 
characterized  by wage and price setters,  and in particular  implicit  or ex- 
plicit contractual  wage and price relationships,  will display  the observed 
property  of short-run  changes  in output  and employment  and slow wage 
and price adjustment.  Second,  in such a world, it is possible, at least in 
principle,  to design  a "request-control"  system  of wage  and  price controls 
that could slow inflation  without the loss of real output resulting  from 
demand-restraint  policies  and  the restriction  on relative-price  adjustments 
characteristic  of earlier controls. The analysis of the response of the 
economy  to recession  emphasizes  the labor market.  Equal time will not 
be devoted  to product  markets.  This focus reflects  both my comparative 
advantage  and my belief that the response  of the labor market  is very 
important  in the overall  picture.  The product  side is considered,  however, 
along  with  labor  markets,  when  controls  are analyzed  and  when  the possi- 
bility is recognized  that  fluctuations  in prices  of raw materials  may cause 
price  inflation  to diverge  from its usual  relationship  to wage inflation. 
The paper starts  with a simulation  model that shows how the ability 
of a given recessionary  path of output to  slow the rate of inflation  is 
diminished,  ceteris  paribus,  when wages are adjusted  less frequently  be- 
cause  wage  contracts  are  in force.  This  result  is a partial  one. It does show 
4.  Certainly,  many financial  markets  satisfy efficiency  or random-walk  properties. 
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that wage contracts  can be an important  determinant  of the economy's 
response  to recession.  But it does not explain (1)  why such contracts 
exist, or (2)  whether  other things  are significantly  different  because  con- 
tracts  exist. The following  two sections  evaluate  some efforts  to develop 
a theory  of implicit  and explicit  contracts.  Some extensions  of the theory 
are then  presented,  along  with the argument  that  the new theory  provides 
at least the outlines of an explanation  for the existence and nature  of 
wage contracts,  one that is firmly  based upon established  economic  prin- 
ciples. The next two sections  consider  the alternative  method  of slowing 
inflation  by wage and price  controls.  In the highly  stylized  economy  con- 
sidered  first, the request-control  system would be perfectly  effective  in 
stemming  inflation  without imposing distortions  at the microeconomic 
level. Some issues that would arise  if the system  were applied  in a more 
realistic  setting  are then considered.  The discussion  of the control  system 
can be viewed  in two ways: as an outline  of a potentially  practical  method 
of applying  controls  or alternatively  as a useful exercise  in theory  against 
which  to measure  actual  control  systems. 
Simulating  the Effect  of Wage  Contracts 
In preparing  his presidential  address  to the American  Economic  Asso- 
ciation,5  James  Tobin developed  a simulation  model  that emphasized  the 
behavior  of the labor  market  and  disaggregated  it into ten sectors.6  In this 
model, real aggregate  demand  is determined  exogenously  although  the 
implied  IS-LM  determination  would  not be hard  to specify.  A given  level 
of aggregate  demand  is divided  among  the sectors  according  to a stochastic 
process, lending the model the desirable  feature of a stochastic equi- 
librium  in which some sectors  have excess demand  for labor and some 
have excess supply.  Past wages or prices  feed back into current  wage in- 
creases  in each sector. Those sectors  with excess demand  for labor will 
tend to accelerate  the rate of wage  inflation  and those with excess supply 
will tend to decelerate  it. The stochastic  equilibrium  occurs  when these 
pressures  just offset each other except for random  movements.  Unem- 
5.  James Tobin, "Inflation and Unemployment," American Economic Review, 
vol. 62 (March 1972), pp. 1-18. 
6. I have raised the number to twelve, because that is divisible conveniently by 
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ployment  exists in equilibrium-a NAIRU, in fact-because  workers  in 
excess-supply  sectors  cannot  immediately  fill vacancies  in excess-demand 
sectors.  Workers  do move between  sectors,  however,  in response  to wage 
differences  and vacancies. 
This model looked like a suitable  framework  within  which to explore 
the impact of changes  in the frequency  of adjustment  of wages. In the 
Tobin specification,  wages are changed  in every sector in every period 
(here, a quarter). The effect of contracts  was then simulated  by intro- 
ducing  annual  wage changes  and, in a multiyear  contract,  by making  the 
amount  of the increase (or decrease) the same in each year of the con- 
tract.7  This procedure  will not make wages stickier  in any trivial way 
because  the specified  annual  increase  is four times  the quarterly  increase 
implied  by the Tobin parameters.  Contracts  simply slow down the fre- 
quency  of wage adjustments.  However,  since the recession  is specified  as 
a given path of  real aggregate  output,  the reduced  frequency  of adjust- 
ment will actually  curtail  the reduction  of the inflation  resulting  from the 
given recessionary  path. This is the main result.  Furthermore,  using this 
model  lends some objectivity  to the results  that  would  be lacking  in those 
of a simulation  model that I made to order  for this specific  purpose. 
FORMAL  STRUCTURE 
Real demand  in each sector  is set according  to 
(1)  Djo  ao  for all i 
Dit=  at  [Dit-  (1 +  p) +  fit  (1 ?  p)t ]for all i 
aO 
E  (it  =O  for ai  t, 
where  Dit is the demand  for the output  of the ith sector  in period  t, p is 
the exogenously  set quarterly  rate of increase  of productivity  (3 percent 
annually),  and  eit is a random  variable  chosen  by a random-number  gen- 
erator.  Real aggregate  demand  is set by choosing  a,, the initial level in 
each  of the sectors,  and  then  the path  of at over  time;  at = a, simply  holds 
the quarterly  rate of growth  in aggregate  demand  at p. This is the trend 
7.  Susan J. Lepper gave important assistance in converting the Tobin model to 
allow contracts. She has studied the effect of indexing on wage contracts using this 
model; see her 'Wage Indexing: Boon or Boom?" (preliminary  paper prepared  for 
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growth  rate  of potential  output  for the economy  since labor-force  growth 
and  capital  accumulation  are suppressed.  If a, is chosen  so that  the econ- 
omy starts  in stochastic  equilibrium,  then setting  at < a0  for a period  will 
induce  a recession. 
Producers  are assumed  to set a desired  level of output  by extrapolating 
last period's  demand  by the trend  rate  of growth  of demand  and adding  a 
fractional  adjustment  of actual  inventories  to desired  inventories:8 
(2)  *  [D=Dit  +  b (S*  -  Sit,)]  (1  +  p), 
where  Q* is desired  output,  S* desired  inventory,  and  S actual  inventory. 
Actual output (Q)  is the smaller  of desired  output  and capacity  output 
(C): 
(3)  Qit  =  min [Q*,  Cit]. 
And capacity  output is determined  by the available  labor supply (L) 
adjusted  for productivity  growth: 
(4)  CiLt  (1 ?  p)t. 
The above relations  are then used to determine  the excess demand  or 
excess  supply  for labor  in a particular  sector: 
(5)  Xit  Q* (1 +  p)  -tLit, 
where  Xit is the excess demand  for labor  in sector  i and  is positive  when- 
ever  desired  output  exceeds  actual  output  and negative  whenever  desired 
output  is less than capacity  output. 
The total  labor  force is constant  but moves  between  sectors  in response 
to differences  in wages  (W) and  job opportunities: 
(6)  Zijt=  e  ?Wit  -  wjt  +f(Xit  -Xt)5 
where  Zitt  is the number  of workers  moving  from sector  i to sector  j in 
period  t. This  means  labor  supply  is given  by 
(7)  Lo=  ao 
L  = Lt-,  +  ?  it-X  . 
In a sector  with  no wage  contracts  the adjustment  in each  quarter  (Wi) 
depends  upon the magnitude  of excess supply  or demand  in the current 
quarter  and  its average  over  the  four  preceding  quarters  plus a term  repre- 
8. Desired inventories are constant, equal to 100 units of real output. Martin  Neil Baily  591 
senting the average  rate of price inflation (P)  in the four preceding 
quarters: 
(8)  Wt=  cX't +  dXVt  +  0.25 
4 
Pt_k  +  P, 
where 
Xit  xit-  ;<  0 
Lit-k 
(9)  =  t  2-  i  it  xit  >  o 
57z Lit-k 
k=l 
so that the effect of excess demand  is twice that of excess supply.  The 
variable  Xlt is defined  similarly,  replacing  Xit above  with the average  of 
Xi,  over the four quarters  t -  1 to t -  4. The wage level in each sector 
is then  given  by 
(10)  Wit  =  Witi  (1  +  Wit), 
and  then  the price  level in each  sector  is set by a markup  relation: 
(11)  pt  =  Wt-  P. 
The average  rate of price or wage inflation  is computed  as a weighted 
average  of the sectoral  rates using a chain  index with the output  of each 
sector  as weights. 
Equations  8 and 11 imply  a wage-price  spiral  but substituting  11 into 8 
could  just  as easily  turn  the  model  into a wage-wage  spiral.  The distinction 
between  the two cases is, of course,  crucial  in the real economy,  which  is 
subject  to fluctuations  in commodity  prices  that break  down  equation  11, 
but I do not deal with this problem.  To summarize,  the main  properties 
of the adjustment  equation  are ( 1  ) current  excess  supply  or demand  has a 
bigger  influence  than past conditions  (actually  c = d in equation  8, but 
X is an average of past quarters); (2)  wages respond  twice as rapidly 
to excess  demand  as to excess  supply;  (3 ) there  is a full feedback  of prices 
(or wages in  the wage-wage  case); and (4)  with no excess supply or 
demand  and no price inflation,  wages grow at the same rate as produc- 
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SIMULATION  RESULTS 
Wage contracts  of one, two, three,  and four years were considered  in 
the model.  In all four types  of contract,  wages  are  changed  annually,  with 
the same annual  increase  applying  to each year of multiyear  contracts. 
The amount  of the annual  increase  in contract  sectors  was based on the 
parameters  of equation  8; hence,  the quarterly  rate  of increase  from 8 was 
multiplied  by four.9  Three  combinations  of contract  lengths  were  analyzed 
as distinct  cases, and a no-contract  situation  formed  the fourth  case. The 
three combinations  were (1)  eight sectors  of two-year  and four of one- 
year contracts;  (2)  all twelve with three-year  contracts;  and (3)  eight 
with four-year  and four with two-year  contracts.  The contract  renewal 
dates  were  staggered  evenly  in all cases. 
To examine  the response  of the model to recession,  simulations  were 
run comparing  the rate of inflation  obtained  with steady growth  of real 
aggregate  demand  to the rate resulting  from a fairly  long and severe  re- 
cession. The "no recession"  runs assumed  that real aggregate  demand 
grew at the trend  growth  rate of potential  output  throughout.  The initial 
level of demand  was set so that the unemployment  rate  was about  3 per- 
cent except  for random  changes;  and it remained  close to that  initial  rate 
in the no-recession  case, as shown  in column  1 of table 1. The model  with 
quarterly  wage adjustments-that is, no contracts-was first simulated 
with an initial price inflation  rate of 12 percent  and no recession. The 
resulting  annualized  rates  of price  inflation,  shown  in column  3 of table 1, 
drop slightly  at first;  it then follows a path with no particular  tendency 
to accelerate  or decelerate,  responding  to random  shocks and displaying 
positive serial  correlation  because  of the wage-price  feedback. 
The simulation  runs with recession  had a path of real demand  that 
differed  from the no-recession  path only during  quarters  24 through  58, 
when they specified  a rather  severe  decline  in real demand,  followed  by 
a recovery.  The resulting  path of unemployment  is given  in column  2 of 
table 1. The effect  of this  recession  on the rate of price  inflation  in the no- 
contract  version  of the model  is shown  in column  4 of table 1. The differ- 
ences between the recession and no-recession  inflation  rates, given in 
column  5 of table 1, reveal  the considerable  impact of the recession.  The 
reduction  in the inflation  rate by the thirteenth  year (just over halfway 
9. This technique is not precise because it does not allow for compound-interest 
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through  the recession) is over 12 points. As the path of  real demand 
returns  to the no-recession  path, the model settles down with inflation 
reduced  by 13.8 points. 
For each of the contract  cases, the same simulation  runs  were  made  to 
compare  the path of the inflation  rate without  and with recession.  The 
arithmetic  differences  for each of the cases  are  shown  in columns  6, 7, and 
8 of table 1. The amount  by which  the given  recession  reduces  the rate  of 
inflation  is much smaller  for all of the contract  cases than for the no- 
contract  case, and  is progressively  smaller  as the contracts  lengthen.'0 
INTERPRETING  THE  RESULTS 
A simple  technical  or mechanical  reason  within  the model  explains  why 
an increase  in the contract  length  dilutes  the effect  of a given  recession  on 
inflation.  It is because  the longer  contracts  are relative  to the duration  of 
the recession,  the less frequently  is the rate  of wage  increase from  equation 
8 subjected  to the downward  pressure  of excess  supply.  A more  behavioral 
explanation  can  be offered  along  the  following  lines.  First  substitute  equa- 
tion 11 into 8 to give the wage-wage  version of the model: 
4 
(8')  Wit =  cX~t  +  d)zt +  0.25 E  Wt_k, 
where W is the average  rate of wage inflation  across  all sectors.  Accord- 
ing to this  equation,  workers  and  firms  determine  the appropriate  nominal 
wage increases  for their sector over the contract  life from the recent 
experience  of excess supply  or demand  and the recent  rate of economy- 
wide wage inflation.  Consider  a sector that comes up for renewal  when 
the average  rate of wage inflation  has been 10 percent.  Suppose  that the 
remaining  terms  of equation  8' (involving  the Xs) add  up to -1  percent. 
If this sector  has a one-year  contract,  it will set a single  wage  increase  of 
9 percent.  Compared  with wage  increases  granted  in recent  contracts,  the 
workers  settle for a 1 percent  decline  in their  relative  wage over the one 
year of the contract.  If the sector  has a three-year  contract,  it sets a wage 
increase  of 9 percent  in each of the three  years.  With the same  expecta- 
tions, the firm  and  its workers  settle  for a 1 percent  decline  in the relative 
10. The average length of contract in the one- and two-year case is one and two- 
thirds years. The average  length in the two- and four-year  case is three and one-third 
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wage over each year of the contract,  about a 3 percent  decline overall. 
Thus,  relative  to the expectations  held at the time  the contracts  are  made, 
the wage-setting  decision  process  is no stickier  in the three-year  than in 
the one-year  case. But the result  is different  when the actual  rate of infla- 
tion is declining.  Then, a high rate of expected  inflation  is incorporated 
into a three-year  contract,  whereas  three one-year  contracts  will reflect 
annual  revisions  in expectations. 
In addition  to the rate of inflation,  the conditions  of excess supply  or 
demand  are also extrapolated  for the length  of the contract.  The impact 
on the simulation  runs  is not great,  however,  because  the decline  into the 
recession  is reversed  during  the recovery.  Some contracts  do not come 
up for renewal  for several quarters  after the recession hits. Thus, the 
Table 1.  Simulation  of the Impact of a Recession on the Inflation  Rate 
with and without  Wage Contracts 
Unemployment  Inflation  rate in  Difference  in inflation  rate as a result 
rate  no-contract  case  of the recession  (percentage  points) 
(percent)  (percent)  One-  and  Three-  Two-  and 
Without  With  Without  With  No  two-year  year  four-year 
recession recession recession recessiotn  conztracts  conitracts  contracts contracts 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1  3.4  3.4  11.7  11.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2  3.2  3.2  11.4  11.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3  3.2  3.2  11.2  11.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  3.3  3.3  11.0  11.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
5  2.9  2.9  10.9  10.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
6  3.2  4.0  10.8  tO.7  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
7  2.9  7.4  10.7  9.6  1.1  0.7  0.3  0.2 
8  3.0  10.0  10.7  7.8  2.9  2.0  0.9  0.6 
9  3.3  9.8  10.7  5.7  4.9  3.2  1.5  1.2 
10  3.2  9.7  10.7  3.7  7.0  4.5  2.1  2.1 
11  3.0  9.7  10.8  1.7  9.1  5.9  2.9  2.7 
12  2.8  9.7  10.8  -0.3  11.1  7.0  3.4  3.3 
13  3.2  7.8  10.9  -2.0  12.9  8.1  4.3  3.6 
14  3.1  4.6  10.9  -2.9  13.8  8.5  4.5  3.9 
15  3.0  3.0  10.9  -3.0  13.8  8.9  4.7  4.1 
16  3.2  3.2  10.8  -3.0  13.8  9.0  4.7  4.2 
17  3.5  3.5  11.0  -2.8  13.8  8.9  4.7  4.3 
20  3.0  3.0  11.1  -2.7  13.8  9.2  4.8  3.8 
25  2.9  2.9  11.4  -2.4  13.8  9.1  4.6  4.0 
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initial  response  of the economy  reflects  the wage  increases  set prior  to the 
development  of general  excess  supply.  On the other  hand,  as the economy 
moves out of the recession,  there  will occur  wage increases  that  were set 
during  its course.  These  forces  may  not offset  each other  exactly,  but they 
certainly  do so at least  partially. 
The robustness  of the finding  of a smaller  reduction  in inflation  with 
contracts  may  be subjected  to criticism  on two counts.  First,  extrapolating 
the recent  rate of inflation  is a naive  way of forecasting.  One might  argue 
instead  that  once a decline  in the rate  of inflation  is experienced,  firms  and 
workers  would likely anticipate  further  declines  and hence would set de- 
clining  wage  increases  over a three-year  contract;  such  a process  could  re- 
duce or even eliminate  the differences  shown in table 1. In defense of 
simple  extrapolation,  the behavior  of equation  8 may be realistic,  even if 
naive, and furthermore  may reflect  a decision  rule that is not so naive in 
practice.  The actual  behavior  of wage  inflation  (measured  annually  by the 
rate  of change  of the index  of adjusted  hourly  earnings  in the private  non- 
farm  economy) gives  firms  and  workers  no reason  to expect  that  a decline 
in wage inflation  will be followed  by a further  decline.  If anything,  firms 
and  workers  may have learned  that an initial  decline  tends  to be followed 
by an increase  in the following  year."'  Of course,  extrapolation  does not 
use structural  information,  as full  rationality  requires.  Yet economists  have 
not done all that brilliantly  in forecasting  wage inflation  using structural 
information.  When  the policy decision  was made  in 1974 to fight  inflation 
by means  of recession,  firms  and workers  who did not immediately  build 
into their  contracts  the expectation  of declining  inflation  were  not neces- 
sarily  irrational. 
The second  source  of doubt  about  the results  of the simulation  concerns 
indexing.  If the wage contracts  were  indexed,  the  differing  contract  lengths 
in the model would certainly  have less impact.'2  However,  few contracts 
11. Employment and Traininig  Report of the President, 1976, table C-10, column 
4. The data are annual and are adjusted  for overtime and for interindustry  employ- 
ment shifts. The period was 1950-75. If the rate of wage inflation (AW/W)  is re- 
gressed on its own lagged value and the change in the inflation rate, the resulting 
equation is (AW/W)t =  1.02 (AW/W)t_  -  0.20 [(AW/W)tI  -  (AW/W)t-2], with 
standard  errors of 0.048 and 0.18, respectively, and an R2 of 0.52. The difference 
term is not significant  and the point estimate of the coefficient  is negative. Regressing 
the rate of inflation on its lagged value alone yields (AW/W)t =  1.01 (AW/W)t_1, 
with standard  error  of 0.047 and R2 of 0.50. One cannot say that experience  has over- 
turned a simple extrapolation  rule. 
12. See Lepper,  "Wage  Indexing,"  for further  analysis. 596  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
in the United  States  are indexed;  and  those that are often are asymmetri- 
cal, responding  little to decelerating  inflation.'3  The reasons  for the infre- 
quency of indexing are complex. The cost of living is only one of the 
variables  that  firms  and  workers  consider;  others  include  wages  elsewhere 
and the firm's  expected product  price. No way of indexing  wages offers 
a clear  improvement  over basing  nominal  increases  on expectations  over 
all the relevant  variables. 
While  I am prepared  to argue  in defense  of the general  formulation  of 
behavior  in the model, I would stress  that the simulation  results  should 
be regarded  as very partial  and strictly  ceteris  paribus.  It is possible  that 
varying  contract  lengths  will induce  other  parametric  changes  that  would 
offset  the impact  shown  by the model.  At most,  the model  provides  a clue 
to the  importance  of wage  contracts  in macro  dynamics. 
OTHER  FEATURES  OF  THE  MODEL 
The model illuminates  some other  important  issues.  First, longer  con- 
tracts  show greater  resistance  to the acceleration  of inflation  as well as to 
its deceleration.  This is a plausible  result,  which  may offer  a clue to why 
the mid-1960s  saw  rapid  growth,  declining  unemployment,  and  only slight 
acceleration  of inflation.  Second,  for the reason  just  given  and  for reasons 
discussed  later, contracts  are not necessarily  a "bad thing"  in welfare 
terms.  A contract  comes into existence  because  the parties  believe  it will 
raise  welfare  and  reduce  costs. 
Third, although  the differences  in contract  lengths mainly affect the 
response  to recession  in the model, there are also small changes  induced 
in the steady-state  or no-recession  simulations.  According  to the char- 
acteristics  of labor  mobility  in the model,  specified  by equation  6, workers 
move  in response  to differences  in excess  supply  or demand  and  in wages  in 
different  sectors.  The efficiency  with  which  labor  is allocated  is important. 
If some omniscient  central  planner  were to move workers  immediately 
from one sector  to another  in response  to the random  shocks, he could 
eliminate  unemployment,  avoid  any  excess  supply  of or demand  for labor, 
and  prevent  acceleration  of wage or price  inflation.  The actual  allocation 
13. Contract provisions tend to specify wage increments if the rate of change of 
the consumer price index exceeds some predetermined  number. There is often no 
provision for reducing wage increases for unexpectedly low rates of change of the 
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of labor,  of course,  never  matches  this ideal. Because  the fraction  of ag- 
gregate  demand  allocated  to any sector follows a random  walk, by the 
specification  of equation  1, the extent of excess supply  or demand  in a 
sector  in any period  provides  some guide-though an imperfect  one-to 
allocating  labor across sectors  for future  periods,  with that information 
becoming  less valuable  the further  it is extrapolated  into the future.  Even 
in the no-contract  case, relative  wages  depend  upon past, as well as cur- 
rent,  excess  supply  or demand;  hence, wages  provide  a less efficient  guide 
to labor allocation  in this model than does relative  excess demand,  the 
term  Xt  -  Xjt of equation  6. Wage  differences  will depend  on informa- 
tion that is lagged even more  with wage contracts  than  without  them.  As 
a result,  a somewhat  higher  NAIRU might  be expected  in the model  with 
wage contracts  than without  them.'4  Evidence  of this tendency  appeared 
in the simulations:  in the no-recession  runs  the inflation  rates  for all the 
contract  cases  were  a little  higher  than  those  of the no-contract  case shown 
in column  3 of table 1. It seems  likely  that  in the real  world some  workers 
remain unemployed  during nonrecessionary  periods hoping to regain 
high-wage  jobs they have lost, even though  the high wage reflects  a con- 
tract  made  under  conditions  no longer  prevailing.  If such  workers  moved, 
they might  reduce  the excess demand  for labor  elsewhere.  The impact of 
wage contracts  on the NAIRU is an interesting  topic  for further  research. 
Some  Aspects  of the New Contract  Theory 
This section  reviews  the theory  of contracts  to see how well it explains 
the existence  of contracts  in the labor  market  and  the form  that  they  take. 
It does not pretend  to summarize  the now extensive  literature.'5  While 
14. If demand shocks showed negative serial correlation, this would not be true. 
Wage contracts could provide a smoothing of wages that reduced inefficient labor 
mobility. 
15. The following is only a partial list, roughly in chronological  order;  and not all 
the authors may wish to be called contract analysts. Martin  Neil Baily, "Wages  and 
Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review  of  Economic Studies, vol.  41 
(January 1974), pp. 37-50; Costas Azariadis,  "Implicit  Contracts  and Underemploy- 
ment Equilibria,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 83 (December 1975), pp. 1183- 
1202; Donald F. Gordon, "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," 
Economic Inquiry,  vol. 12 (December 1974), pp. 431-59; Costas Azariadis, "On  the 
Incidence of  Unemployment," Review  of  Economic Studies, vol.  43  (February 
1976), pp. 115-25; Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter,  and Jeffrey  E. Harris, 598  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
the existence  and  importance  of wage  contracts  has long  been  recognized, 
a distinctive  feature  of the new theory  is that it considers  implicit  as well 
as explicit  contracts.  It seeks  to explain  contract-like  arrangements  where 
no explicit legal contracts  exist. This is very important  because  although 
the observed  wage-employment  adjustments  may be somewhat  different 
in union and nonunion  sectors,  the general  pattern is so pervasive  that 
a "union-only"  explanation  of wage  responsiveness  is hard  to sustain.-6 
The first  question,  then,  is why  workers  and  firms  would  want  a contract 
that resulted  in a path for wages and employment  other  than  that  result- 
ing from the instantaneous  interaction  of prevailing  market  forces. Both 
firms  and  workers  have an interest  in establishing  a long-term  relationship 
-over  several  years.  There  is a daily  spot  market  in the shares  of General 
Motors, but not in its employees.  For workers,  changing  employers  is 
costly. Job changes  may involve unemployment,  search, possibly relo- 
cating,  and  such other  costs  as giving  up friends  and  accepting  many  other 
changes  in life patterns.  Turnover  is costly for firms,  too, imposing  ad- 
ministrative  hiring  and  firing  costs, and  loss of specific  human  capital  that 
workers  acquire  on the job and of the team effect whereby  a group of 
workers  who know each other and the work place perform  more effi- 
ciently. Thus, a strong element of bilateral  monopoly encourages  both 
firms and workers  to determine  a jointly efficient  way to set the wage 
path and conditions  of employment  over some extended  period.  The in- 
"Understanding  the Employment  Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic  Exchange," 
Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 6 (Spring 1975), pp. 250-78; Steven Shavell, "Shar- 
ing Risks of Deferred Payment,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (February 
1976), pp. 161-68; Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation:  Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," 
BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 351-90; Herschel I. Grossman, "The Nature of Optimal Labor 
Contracts"  (paper presented  at the Third Reisenburg  Symposium, 1975; processed); 
Martin Neil Baily, "On the Theory of Layoffs and Unemployment,"  Econometrica, 
vol.  45  (September 1977),  forthcoming; Martin Feldstein, "Temporary Layoffs 
in the Theory of Unemployment,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (October 
1976),  pp.  937-57;  Robert J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in the Theory of 
Inflation  and Unemployment,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 2 (April 1976), 
pp.  185-219  (this paper contains additional references); Herschel I.  Grossman, 
"Risk Shifting and Reliability in Labor Markets," Scandinavian Journal of  Eco- 
nomics, vol. 79 (1977),  forthcoming. 
16. As Robert E. Hall has noted in "The Rigidity of Wages and the Persistence 
of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 301-35,  the government and regulated sec- 
tors now employ an impressive  part of the labor force. One might want to construct 
a theory of wages for workers in the union plus government  plus regulated sectors. 
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terest  the two parties  have in staying  together  insulates  against  short-run 
fluctuations  in market  conditions. 
This kind of argument  does not completely  explain wage stickiness, 
however.  In practice,  the arrangements  between  firms and workers  are 
contingent contracts,  under which the income a worker  will receive in 
some future  period depends  upon the market  conditions  in that period; 
and that dependence  must be explained.  When a firm  faces a decline  in 
the demand  for its product,  it does reduce  its labor input  promptly  and 
often substantially.  On the other  hand,  it deviates  little  from  the predeter- 
mined  path of wage rates, especially  under  an explicit  legal contract  but 
also when contracts  are only implicit.'7  Even when  the wage  path  is reset 
or renegotiated  in the presence  of excess supply  of labor,  the new path is 
not chosen  to eliminate  the excess supply,  at least in the short  run. 
In addition  to the behavior  of wages, an explanation  is required  for 
the choice between  shortening  the workweek  and cutting  the work  force 
as a means  of varying  labor  input  during  recession.  Although  in practice 
hours per worker  do vary somewhat,  the larger  part of the adjustment 
in manhours  comes  from  employment  variations,'8  for  reasons  that  require 
investigation. 
In summary,  contingent  contracts  have an obvious appeal for both 
firms  and  workers,  but  the  reasons  why  these  contracts  result  in substantial 
variations  in employment,  modest  variations  in hours,  and a sluggish  re- 
sponse  of the wage  path  are  less obvious. 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  OPTIMAL  CONTINGENT  CONTRACT 
One approach  to understanding  the form  of contingent  contracts  starts 
with  the way a firm  and  its workers  divide  up the risks  of demand  fluctua- 
tions. In this view, stockholders  can bear risks  more easily than workers 
can because they are better able to diversify  their risks. Even though 
17. Robert E. Hall has argued that individual wages may be more flexible than 
scale wages; see "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market,"  BPEA, 2:1974, 
pp. 343-93. But allowing for this possibility does not change the basic picture. 
18. Arthur M. Okun estimates that about 20 percent of a cyclical addition to or 
subtraction  from labor input was due to hours variations;  see "Upward  Mobility in 
a High-pressure  Economy," BPEA, 1:1973, p. 211. Further analysis of the response 
of hours and employment can be found in Ray C. Fair, A Model of Macroeconomic 
Activity, vol. 2: The Empi-ical Model (Ballinger, 1976), and Christopher  A. Sims, 
"Output  and Labor Input in Manufacturing,"  BPEA, 3:1974, pp. 695-728. 600  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
workers  may be able to borrow  and lend-at  least, lend-stockholders 
can operate  in capital  markets  on better  terms  than workers  and, there- 
fore, logically  should  absorb  more of any joint risks.'9  This idea was the 
basis for a model that showed  that firms  will actually  eliminate  wage un- 
certainty,  and surprisingly  this  result  holds even if workers  face a positive 
probability  of layoff.20  To understand  this consider  the following  expres- 
sion, which  is the expected  utility of a worker  in some period: 
(12)  Expected utility =  E[  u  U (Y.)  ?  (I  L)  (Y)] 
where 
N =  employment 
L =  the number  of workers  seeking  employment 
N/L  =  the probability  of employment 
Y,  =  the wage  income  in the  period 
Y. =  the income  of a worker  if he is not employed-that is, laid off. 
If workers  are risk averse, eliminating  the uncertainty  of Yw,  will raise 
expected  utility  even  if N < L-that  is, even  if there  is some  prospect  of a 
layoff. Further,  the result  holds for any positive  N, so that it must hold 
for the optimal  N.  Of course, in equation  12 one could still trade off a 
higher  probability  of employment  for greater  wage uncertainty  and leave 
expected utility unchanged.  But when the firm absorbs  the risks, that 
tradeoff is never efficient. The employment decision and the wage decision 
are, in fact, separable.  If two people are  partners  in a game  of bridge,  for 
example,  they can follow an optimal  strategy  to maximize  their  winnings. 
This strategy  is separate  from any decision about the way in which to 
divide  their  winnings.  A firm  and  its workers  acting  in concert  will choose 
the level of production  and the employment  consequent  on that decision 
in order  to maximize  their  joint  welfare  (that  is, to be on their  utility-possi- 
bility  frontier).  The  wage  then  determines  how the  welfare  is divided.  This 
property  of efficient  contingent  contracts  is more  general  than  the particu- 
lar risk-division  model described  here. It means that the wage and the 
marginal  product  of labor  are  not always  equal  in the short  run,  although 
19. Moreover, the simple borrowing and lending process does not eliminate un- 
certainty, which requires  insurance  or some kind of pooling of risks. 
20.  See Baily, "Wages and Employment."  Among the assumptions used in the 
model were risk-neutral  firms, no borrowing and lending by workers, no variations 
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when  hiring  a worker  a firm  will still  weigh  his expected  marginal  product 
against  his expected  wage cost over the duration  of their  job attachment. 
It should be emphasized  that reaching  the optimal contract  will often 
depend  on close cooperation  between  firms  and workers  and this in turn 
depends  upon  the forces  that encourage  long-term  relationships.2' 
The separability  of the labor-utilization  decision  and  the wage  decision 
in  an optimal cooperative contingent contract has important  conse- 
quences. First, somewhat  paradoxically  it means that even though the 
risk-allocation  model can provide  an explanation  of the stickiness  of the 
wage path, that stickiness  does not in itself explain  the failure  to use the 
available  labor  input  fully. However,  the contract  approach  suggests  look- 
ing for an explanation  in the opportunity  cost of a worker's  time. When 
product  demand  falls it may be more efficient  (privately,  but not neces- 
sarily  socially) to stop using some labor in the production  of output.  In 
fact, while risk aversion  and such considerations  as fairness and wage 
bargaining  are probably  important  to the stickiness  of the wage  path, the 
key issue is the extent  to which  variations  in labor  input  are derived  from 
a jointly  optimal  contract. 
The central  analytical  argument  takes  the following  form:  If a reduction 
of labor  utilization  is simply  one of the outcomes  of an optimal  long-run 
contingent  contract  between  the firm  and its workers,  this reduction  will 
not result  in excess supply  of labor  in the usual  Walrasian  sense and  con- 
sequently  will not exert  the same  downward  pressure  on wage  rates. 
For this argument  to be convincing,  however,  the observed  pattern  of 
layoffs  and variations  in hours  must  correspond  to the pattern  that  would 
follow from an optimal  contingent  contract.  Therefore,  I decided  in sub- 
sequent  work  to focus on the determinants  of layoffs  and of variations  in 
hours  within  the context  of a contingent  contract  model,  but to drop  the 
assumption  of  risk aversion. Two independent  but somewhat similar 
models developed  by myself and by Martin  Feldstein22  derived  the re- 
21.  See the discussion of mobility costs as an important  factor sustaining  the im- 
plicit contract in Baily, "Wages  and Employment."  The analysis here is focused on 
the nature of optimal cooperative contracts. But potential conflicts over the division 
of the joint welfare, and the possibility of default, may lead to contracts that could 
be improved upon with full  cooperation but that are optimal given the costs of 
negotiation and default. For  further discussion of  this issue, see also Grossman, 
"Optimal  Labor Contracts." 
22.  Baily, "Layoffs and Unemployment," and Feldstein, "Temporary  Layoffs in 
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sponse to demand  fluctuations  that is optimal  for a firm  and its workers 
combined.23  The  optimal  joint  response  to a fall in demand  is to reduce  the 
worker  hours  of labor input and hence the quantity  of output.  The divi- 
sion of a reduction  of labor  input  between  layoffs  and  lower  hours  of work 
is given  by the following  equations.  For layoffs,  the condition  is 
(13)  PG'(NH)H  -  D(H)  2  YU  -T 
and  for hours  of work  the  condition  is 
(14)  PG'(NH)=  D(H), 
where 
P =  the  price  of the firm's  product 
N  =  employment 
H =  weekly  hours  of work  per  worker 
D (H) =  the disutility  of working  H hours (related  to the utility  of 
leisure) 
G(NH)  =  the production  function  with  capital  held constant 
G'(NH)  =  the marginal  physical  product  of an extra  hour's  work 
G'(NH)H  =  the marginal  physical  product  of an extra  worker 
Y=  the income (or income  equivalent)  received  by a worker 
if he is laid off by the firm-that is, the value of his time 
if he is laid off (including  unemployment  insurance  bene- 
fits  received) 
T = the turnover  cost to the firm  of a layoff (including  the 
fraction  of the unemployment  benefit  paid  for by the firm 
through  its experience  rating). 
The intuitive  content  of these conditions  is straightforward.  Condition 
14 says that hours  of work are always  set so that the value of the hourly 
marginal  product  is equal to the marginal  disutility  of work. The layoff 
rule says that only if the left-hand  side of 13 is less than the right will 
layoffs  be made, and then in sufficient  quantity  to restore  equality.  This, 
in turn,  means  that  layoffs  take  place when  the net value  of working  (the 
23. To simplify the analysis the firm is assumed  to be a price-taker  in the product 
market. Demand fluctuations  in the models are price fluctuations.  This is not an ideal 
assumption  to use in a model of cyclical demand changes. In fact, it is not consistent 
with the earlier comments about how changes in aggregate  demand  influence  output. 
However, the main ideas would carry over to more complex cases. The simple as- 
sumption does prevent confusing the issues of  labor market response with issues 
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value of the worker's  marginal  product  less the disutility  of producing  it) 
falls below the net value of a layoff (the value of a worker's  time if laid 
off, Y., less the turnover  cost, T). Two key parameters  in determining 
the number  of layoffs  for a given  fall in demand  are,  therefore,  Y. and T. 
There  are two parts  to Y.: unemployment  insurance  (UI), and  the value 
of time spent  searching  for and  potentially  finding  an alternative  job. The 
utility  of leisure also plays a role in the layoff  rule; it is the term  D (H) 
on the left-hand  side  of equation  13. 
In the case of permanent  layoffs or discharges,  the layoff rule looks 
sensible. If demand  falls for one firm, it becomes worthwhile  for some 
workers  to move elsewhere.  Equation 13 tells when it is appropriate  to 
make the move, given unemployment  insurance  to subsidize  the tran- 
sition. But in fact about two-thirds  of all layoffs are temporary  in the 
sense  that  workers  return  to their  former  jobs after  being  recalled  by their 
employers.24  Equation  13 suggests  that  hours  will  be reduced  substantially 
before  temporary  layoffs  occur,  unless  there  is a sizable  UI benefit  that  is 
not effectively  experience-rated,25  and implies that a very large fraction 
of layoffs  can be blamed  on the UI system.  While  some evidence  suggests 
that UI does play a role in increasing  unemployment  and layoffs,26  the 
historical experience  is that extensive  layoffs rather  than work-sharing 
formed  the basic pattern  before  the system  was established.  In particular, 
UI was a response to an existing  phenomenon.27  Moreover,  the desire  of 
24.  Martin S. Feldstein, "The Importance of Temporary  Layoffs: An Empirical 
Analysis,"  BPEA, 3:1975, pp. 733-36, and "Discussion"  (of Thomas F. Bradshaw  and 
Janet L. Scholl, "The Extent of Job Search during Layoff"), BPEA, 2:1976, p. 525. 
25.  Clearly, a statement like this depends upon the interaction of all the param- 
eters. But to support  it, consider the following polar case: (1)  workers  do not search 
for alternative  jobs so that Yu  = B, the UT benefit; (2)  UI is fully experience-rated 
so that T >  B (that is, firms pay the full cost of Ul benefits, which in turn are tax- 
able);  (3)  workers have increasing marginal disutility for work or, equivalently, 
diminishing marginal utility  of  leisure:  D" >  0.  Substituting 14  into  13  yields 
D'(H)H  -  D(H)  for the left-hand side of 13. This is strictly positive for H >  0 by 
the third condition. Then the first  two imply Y,, -  T <  0 so that the three conditions 
rule out temporary  layoffs. This result would stand if the specification  of the model 
were changed by substituting marginal revenue for price, since that would affect 
equations 13 and 14 equivalently. 
26. See, for example, the papers  included in the symposium  on UT,  forthcoming  in 
Industrial  and Labor Relations Review. 
27. Between 1929 and 1932 manufacturing  employment  fell from 10.7 million to 
6.9 million, or by 36 percent. In the same period, average weekly hours fell from 
44.2 to 38.3, or 13 percent. There was no UI at that time and other cost factors 
favoring layoffs, such as fringe benefits  and payroll taxes, were very minor. 604  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
firms  to avoid the loss of firm-specific  human  capital makes  layoffs  look 
even less attractive  (in the model this would raise T, the turnover  cost). 
The key question  posed above  is whether  the theory  of the optimal  con- 
tingent  contract  provides  an empirically  valid picture  of how labor  input 
is varied.  The conclusion  seems  to be that the model  predicts  more  varia- 
tions in hours  and fewer  layoffs  in response  to a downturn  than are actu- 
ally observed.  Invoking  the UI system  makes  the model's  prediction  more 
compatible  with observation,  but this way out does not seem to be satis- 
factory  in the light of historical  experience.  These tentative  results  could 
mean  that the basic  approach  is wrong,  but alternatively  they could  mean 
merely  that the model is incomplete.  The latter  view is taken  in the next 
section,  which  seeks  to extend  the  model. 
DIFFERENCES  IN  LAYOFF  PROBABILITIES  AMONG  WORKERS 
Most firms  have a group of workers  who have been with them for a 
number  of years.  Although  average  turnover  rates are high, it is striking 
how many  workers  actually  stay  with  a single  firm  for many  years.  Table  2 
gives  data  on this  question  from  the  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of males 
who were between  45 and 59 in 1966 and who reported  in 1966 and in 
subsequent  surveys on the length of their longest spell with the same 
employer.28  The information  in table 2, which applies  to completed  and 
uncompleted  longest spells as of 1971, reveals that of workers  still in 
their  longest  spell, 93 percent  had been with  their  employer  for ten years 
or more, and 64 percent  for twenty  years or more. The percentages  are 
somewhat  lower for completed  spells;  but for the two groups  taken to- 
gether,  they are still 86 percent  for ten years  or more and 52 percent  for 
twenty  years  or more.  Furthermore,  these are  underestimates,  because  the 
first  group consists  of workers  who have not yet completed  their  longest 
spell  with  the same  employer. 
Along with its long-term  employees,  the firm  will generally  also have 
a group of more recent hires that typically  comprises  younger  workers, 
but  may also include  some  older  workers  who have  high  turnover  through- 
out their working  lives. As many people have observed,  layoffs are not 
applied  equally  to workers  in the two groups,  but are  made  in a systematic 
28.  Survey of Work Experience of Men 45-59  sponsored by the Manpower  Ad- 
ministration  of the U.S. Department  of Labor and conducted by the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census. way, generally  based  upon seniority.29  Workers  gradually  acquire  tenure, 
or at least greater  job security,  after they have been with the same firm 
for a number  of years.  Although  there  is no really  clear-cut  line between 
the two groups, several writers  have found these and other differences 
sharp  enough  so that they speak of a dual, or "two-tier,"  labor  market.30 
Whatever  the reason  for the observed  pattern  of layoffs,  it clearly  has 
important  consequences  for the model of the previous  section. In that 
model  every  worker  was  assumed  to be treated  equally.  The  tradeoff  of lay- 
offs versus  reduction  in hours  was  in terms  of, say, 10 percent  fewer  hours 
or a 10 percent  probability  of layoff  for everyone.  But, given  the seniority 
system,  the tradeoff  for most workers  is between 10 percent  fewer hours 
and  virtually  a zero  probability  of layoff,  while  for other  workers  the  layoff 
probability  is close to unity if hours are not reduced.  Since layoffs are 
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Table 2.  Distribution  of Male Workers, 45-59 in 1966, by Years of 
Longest Period with Employer, 1971a 
Employment  status and 
years withl  employer  Percen7t  of this  group  Percent  of total 
Still with  longest  employer 
0-4  0.8  0.5 
5-9  6.5  3.8 
10-19  28.6  16.5 
20-29  35.9  20.7 
30andover  28.2  16.3 
Total  100.0  57.8 
Unemployed  or with  different 
employer 
0-4  6.1  2.6 
5-9  17.1  7.2 
10-19  42.1  17.8 
20-29  24.6  10.4 
30 and over  10.1  4.3 
Total  100.0  42.2 
All  ...  100.0 
Source: Computer tape file, National  Longitudinal Survey, U.S.  Department of  Labor, Manpower 
Administration. Figures are rounded. 
a.  Percentages are calculated from sample numbers that have been weighted to reflect the importance 
of an individual relative to the U.S.  population. 
29.  See, for example, M. W. Reder, "Wage  Structure  and Structural  Unemploy- 
ment," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 31 (October 1964), pp. 309-22. 
30.  Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Man- 
power Analysis (Heath, 1971); Okun, "Upward  Mobility." 606  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
generally  the major response  to a downturn,  the burden  is distributed 
very  unevenly.  Some  workers  are  much  worse  off while  the  majority  escape 
with  little  or no penalty. 
There  are  a number  of possible  explanations  for the layoff  pattern,  more 
than one of which fits the contract-theory  framework.  However, many 
explanations  take layoffs (rather  than hours reductions) as given, and 
merely  consider  which  workers  are  most likely  to be laid off. 
COLLUSIVE  BEHAVIOR  BY  WORKERS 
The idea that  collusion  by workers  explains  the inability  of unemployed 
workers  to bid down wages  has been around  for a long time. The argu- 
ment made here goes beyond the traditional  one in three  ways: First, it 
holds that collusive  behavior  by workers  is potentially  much  more  wide- 
spread  than unionization.  Second, it focuses on the decision to lay off 
workers  who currently  have jobs. Third,  it remains  within  the framework 
of contingent  contracts. 
Following  the approach  of the dual labor  market,  consider  a firm  with 
a group (A)  of experienced  workers,  and a group (B)  of workers  that 
includes  recent  hires.  If all the group  A workers  were  to quit at the same 
time, the firm  would  find it very costly, for it would have to start  afresh 
with completely new workers and would be subject to a team effect, 
mentioned  earlier,  losing  the familiarity  that  its experienced  workers  have 
with each other  and with the operation  of the plant.  An illustration  is the 
heavy start-up  costs of opening a new plant and bringing  productivity 
up to the level of the firm's  other  plants.  To minimize  these costs, in fact, 
firms  usually bring  in a group of experienced  workers  from their other 
plants  to help get things  started.31  These cost factors  mean  that  the group 
A workers  have some monopoly  power over the firm.  Given  this power, 
a likely  reason  for the preference  for layoffs  over  work-sharing  is precisely 
the different  distributional  consequences  of the two. The experienced 
workers  wish  to protect  themselves  from  the burden  of the downturn. 
The group pressure  to bring about the preferred  solution may differ 
31.  The issues raised here are discussed in Doeringer and Piore, Internal Labor 
Markets. Of course, the capital embodied in individual  skilled workers is important. 
For the most part, however, the returns  to this capital are reflected  in relative wages. 
To the extent that firm-specific  human capital exists, and the wage differential  earned 
by an experienced  worker is less than his marginal-productivity  differential,  the bar- 
gaining power of the group A workers  will be enhanced.  See, for example, Walter  Y. 
Oi, "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 70  (De- 
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in different  situations.  At one extreme  it  may be rather  subtle, hardly 
describable  as collusion,  showing  up as "morale  problems"  or "the  workers 
would not stand  for it." At the other  extreme  lies a union, which  makes 
collusion  explicit.  Union members  are  protected  by law against  wholesale 
firing  and have the strike as another  lever to exert bargaining  power.32 
However,  while  unions  probably  do make  a difference,  collusive  behavior 
can be much more widespread  than unionization.  Perhaps  unionization 
is an institutional  response  to the need to apply  group  pressure  in situa- 
tions in which  the workers  do not know each other  well enough  to do so 
informally. 
Take a period  when product  demand  facing the firm  is high. The firm 
may already  have a number  of group  B recent  hires,  but it wishes  to hire 
more. Assume that the group A workers  have been able to bargain  for 
themselves  an expected  income  that  is higher  than  that  necessary  to attract 
workers  to the firm  but that they are willing  to allow an offer  to group  B 
workers  that is no better  than this competitive  expected  income  offer.  In 
fact, to do this is in the interests  of the group  A workers,  since anything 
that raises  the firm's  profits  makes  it easier  for them to achieve  a higher 
expected  income  for themselves. 
Since the firm  can utilize group  B workers  and need offer them only 
the competitive  expected  income,  it will indeed  do so. Group  A and group 
B workers  then will have different contracts.  But what form will they 
take and in particular,  how will they differ?  A fully cooperative  optimal 
contract  between  the firm and its group  A workers,  that maximized  the 
firm's  profit  subject  to a given  expected  income of group  A workers  and 
subject  to the market  constraint  that group  B workers  must receive  the 
competitive  expected  income, would have the following  properties:  (1) 
group B workers  would receive a lower wage than group A workers; 
(2)  the breakdown  between  variations  in hours  and layoffs  would  be the 
same as in the model of the previous  section.83  However,  such a contract 
32. Nonunionized workers  also have means to pressure  the firm. Morale problems 
translate into  productivity problems. There  can  be  go-slows or working-to-rule 
without a union. 
33.  If both types of workers have the same disutility-of-work  function, D(H), 
hours of work will be the same for both. Otherwise  D'(HA) =A  D'(HB),  which can- 
not be optimal. Layoffs would commence at the same point as that given by equation 
13. If not, it would be possible for group 13  workers  to make side payments to allow 
them to continue working. Such a possibility (even if side payments  are not actually 
feasible) shows that any rule other than 13 is not optimal. The difference  in expected 
income between the two groups results from paying a higher hourly wage to the 
group A workers. 608  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
will not be accepted  by the group  A workers  because  of their  quite real- 
istic  fear  of default  by the firm.  Workers  do not in general  know  all aspects 
of the situation  facing  the firm;  in particular,  they cannot  observe  the ex- 
tent of falls in demand,  especially  when such falls do not show up fully 
as declines  in price. Nor can they determine  the turnover  cost, which  in- 
cludes the cost of UI benefits  paid for by experience-rating.  As long as 
there  is no gap between  the expected  income  offered  by the firm  and the 
competitive  expected  income  offer,  this  lack of information  is not so vital. 
A firm  that cheats  its workers  will start  to experience  difficulty  in hiring 
as its bad reputation  spreads.  When  there  is a gap between  the expected 
income group  A workers  have bargained  for themselves  and the market 
expected  income,  cheating  or default  can occur  without  creating  difficul- 
ties in hiring. 
Group A workers must restrict the firm either by specifying the amount 
by which hours can be reduced, or by forcing the firm to pay the same 
wage (adjusted for productivity) to group A and group B workers. Other- 
wise, the firm  can easily  default  on the expected-income  bargain  obtained 
by the group  A workers.84  All it need do is hire more  group  B workers  in 
the boom than  would be justified  by the cooperative  optimal  contract,  and 
then reduce  hours  across  the board  more  in any downturn  than  would  be 
optimal  under  that contract.35 
If there  is a direct  restriction  on reductions  in hours (no short  time,  for 
example), which certainly  will be combined  with a provision  that puts 
secondary  workers  first in line for layoffs, the observed  preference  for 
layoffs  is clearly  understandable.  In that  event,  group  A workers  need not 
specify  the wage  paid  to group  B workers.  The firm  will set that  wage  just 
high enough to compensate  for their layoff probability.  If, instead, the 
group  A workers  require  that the wage paid the two groups  be the same, 
the firm no longer has any incentive  to default  by substituting  cheaper 
group  B hours for group  A hours; that is, given a wage restriction,  the 
group  A workers  need not restrict  variations  in hours.  A simple  explicit 
model with the two types of labor receiving  the same hourly  wage, but 
34. The argument made here is analogous to the one made by Okun in "Infla- 
tion," p. 369, concerning "clean hands"  policies. 
35.  Such a strategy effectively substitutes the cheaper worker hours of group B 
for the more expensive  worker hours of group A. If a firm has eighty group A work- 
ers earning $6 per hour working 41 hours per week, it can lower costs by hiring two 
group B workers at $4 per hour and reducing everyone's  weekly hours to 40. Total 
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different  levels of expected  income,  has the following  properties.  Instead 
of a layoff  rule of the form  of equation  13, there  is a layoff  rule  for group 
B workers  of the  form 
(15)  PG'[(NA +  NB) H]  ? f (Yu,T,  H7, VA-  VB), 
fi > ?,f2<0,f3<0,f4  >0, 
where  f is a relation  depending  on the shadow  prices  of the two types of 
workers;  and VA and VB represent  the expected  incomes  of the two types 
of worker  with VA> VB  by assumption.  The condition  that sets hours 
of work  has  the  same  form  as 14: 
(16)  PG'[(NA +  NB) H]  =  D' (H) 
Equations  15 and 16 imply  that,  in the event  of a downturn  (1 ) there  will 
be some reduction  in hours worked;  (2)  there  will always  be layoffs  of 
group  B workers;  (3)  once the pool of group  B workers  is exhausted,  the 
model will behave  like the model of the previous  section; (4)  UI that is 
not fully experienced-rated  will raise the number  of layoffs for a given 
fall  in demand. 
This  analysis  does not pin down  whether  work-sharing  will be restricted 
by collusive  workers  directly,  or indirectly  by restricting  wage  differentials. 
In either case, the basic amendment  to the earlier  model results  from 
incorporating  the distributional  consequences  of work-sharing  versus  lay- 
offs when  a group  of workers  has the power  to affect  the distribution.  The 
relevant  contingent  contract,  explicit  or implicit,  is between  a firm  and a 
subset  of its workers. 
FACTORS  MITIGATING  ""PURE"  COLLUSION 
A key element  of the collusive  model  was  the ability  of group  A workers 
to raise their expected income above the level needed to attract  new 
workers.  Without  this feature  it is not possible  to impose  the high layoff 
probability  on the group B workers  and still attract  them to the firm. 
However,  the group  B workers  might  take a longer  view,  recognizing  their 
upward  mobility  as group  A workers  retire  or quit.  Because  of the pros- 
pects of moving into the preferred  group, a new hire may accept a job 
with a short-run  expected income actually  lower than he or she could 
obtain  elsewhere. 
At its limit, this immediately  preceding  argument  asserts  that concen- 
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is simply  an optimal  allocation  of the risks  of demand  fluctuations  across 
different  age groups.  Although  the usual specifications  of life-cycle  utility 
functions do not suggest that people will become more risk averse as 
they grow older, both introspection  and casual empiricism  uncover  the 
strong  desire of many people for increasing  income security  over their 
lifetimes.36  During  some periods  in the life cycle children  and mortgages 
make  workers  very anxious  to avoid  income  fluctuations. 
In addition,  if risk  aversion  is to be put back  into the analysis,  the risk 
model described  earlier  has an important  corollary: the greater  is the 
ratio of wage  income  to unemployment  income,  the more  complete  is the 
implicit  insurance  policy a worker  would  wish to purchase  to reduce  his 
probability  of income fluctuations.37 The senior skilled workers have 
higher  pay and are likely to have a higher  ratio of wage  income  to unem- 
ployment  income.88 
These  factors,  however,  do not provide  a satisfactory  alternative  to col- 
lusion as an explanation  for the predominance  of layoffs  over reductions 
in hours.  High-wage  or very risk-averse  workers  may indeed  wish to pay 
an insurance  premium  to reduce  uncertainty,  but the optimal  insurance 
policy would be to reduce  the correlation  between  the wage income  and 
hours  of work.  In the limit  the worker  would  become  salaried.  Thus,  these 
arguments  might  be invoked  to explain  the pattern  of implicit  contracts 
for white-collar  workers,  but  they  are  much  less convincing  for blue-collar 
workers. 
I conclude,  therefore,  that collusion  retains  a role in the explanation  of 
the response  of the labor market  to recession.  The prospect  of upward 
mobility, however,  will certainly  mitigate  the consequences  of collusive 
behavior  on the supply  of group  B workers  to the firm.  It will also ration- 
36. The difficulty  with asking such a question is that people tend to assume one is 
asking "given the present, do I want the future to be better?"  The answer is always 
yes. To a young person, a job that implied a constant risk over his lifetime is not 
obviously less desirable than a job that concentrated the instability now-witness 
the fact that people often save very little to provide for income security in retire- 
ment. 
37.  This point is analyzed by Azariadis, "Incidence  of Unemployment."  He does 
not  consider hours variations, however, and possible differences in  Y.  among 
workers. 
38. Although not necessarily so. In Massachusetts,  for example, the UI benefit is 
50 percent of the wage up to a limit, so the ratio is the same for many workers. 
Many workers first in line for layoffs are not eligible for UI benefits.  Further,  work- 
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alize the distribution  of layoffs  in a political  sense,  making  it more  accept- 
able and making  it seem fair-even  though  it may sometimes  be rather 
unfair,  especially  to those workers  who remain  chronically  in group  B. 
I  conclude, further, that the predictions  of  the optimal contingent 
model, modified  to take into account  the distributional  consequences  of 
layoffs, are consistent  with observations  on the response  of the labor 
market  to demand  fluctuations. 
A Request-Control  System 
The theoretical  analysis  of contracts  has implications  for wage setting 
that introduce  inflationary  momentum  into the process. Any reduction 
in the demand  for labor that is perceived  as temporary  will not change 
the terms  of the implicit  or explicit  contract  between  a firm  and  its workers. 
The wage  is set to track  a long-run  equilibrium  path  or a permanent  wage 
path.  This long-run  path  depends  on market  conditions,  but only on those 
that  are  also seen as long run.  Because  of aversion  to uncertainty,  because 
of possible  iMstitutional  difficulties  in revising  complex  wage scales, and, 
not least, because  the wage represents  the result of bilateral  bargaining, 
setting  the permanent  wage path in practice  usually  means setting  wage 
rates for periods  of one, two, or three  years.  Wage contracts,  like other 
contracts,  are set in dollars  or in nominal  terms,  but, like other  contracts, 
they will embody  information  about other variables.  These will include 
wages  elsewhere,  the  firm's  product  price,  and  the cost of living.  The actual 
movements  of these variables  over the period of the previous  contract 
will be compared  to the movements  that had been anticipated,  and their 
future movements  will be predicted.  Thus, the momentum  of inflation 
gets  built  into  the path  of the nominal  wage. 
Even when  the wage  is renegotiated  the wage  path  will be adjusted  only 
to  the  extent that the perception of  the permanent wage has changed. 
Hence, a contract,  implicit  or explicit,  that  is reset  during  a recession  will 
not be reset generally  in such a way as to eliminate  any current  excess 
supply  of labor  in that  sector.  The importance  of long-run  considerations 
is consistent  with theory  and observation  and is embodied  in the simula- 
tion model. This long-run  focus may be particularly  strong  when firms 
and  workers  realize  that  the  policymakers  are  likely  to restore  the  NAIRU 
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The analysis  above  has stressed  that the existence  of wage contracts- 
the fact that wages are set-may  be a key factor  in explaining  the diffi- 
culty of slowing an established  inflation  by means of a recession.  Space 
does not permit  examining  contracts  in product  markets,  although  they 
probably exist, in both explicit and implicit forms. Some may fit the 
pattern  of customer  markets,  as Okun has analyzed  them;39  but others 
probably  involve the implicit  collusive relation  among sellers. The im- 
portant  aspects  of pricing  for this paper  are the following: (1)  Prices  or 
price  markups  do not respond  enough  to alleviate  the problem  of inflation 
control  that has been described  in the labor market.  (2)  Most prices  as 
well as most wages are set. Firms are not price-takers,  at least over the 
short  run, and  this introduces  an important  common  element  on the price 
and wage sides. Both prices and wages are set and are changed only 
periodically. 
The basic dilemma  in using wage and price controls  as an anti-infla- 
tionary  policy is that, unless a great deal of information  about market 
conditions  in thousands  of markets  is available  so that market-clearing 
relative  wages and prices are known, the controls  impose distortions  of 
relative  prices  and  wages.  Of course,  the model  of a market  economy  that 
implies (Pareto) optimal  conditions  is, in fact, so far removed  from the 
real market  economy  that one wonders  how costly the supposed  distor- 
tions  really  are.  In particular,  the very  fact  that  the real  economy  responds 
as it does to recession  is evidence  that  the assumptions  required  for alloca- 
tive optimality  are  not satisfied. 
Nevertheless,  in an economy  based  on the market  system  the imposition 
of controls  in the absence  of a theoretical  basis that describes  how they 
should work, if only in principle, is a step taken with great  reluctance. 
This section presents  a theoretical  outline for a system  of nondistorting 
wage and price controls.  The system  described  below is not intended  to 
be immediately  practical,  or to be applied  directly  to the economy.  How- 
ever, just as knowing the conditions  under which a market economy 
would  be Pareto  optimal  is a helpful  guide  and  reminder  for  policymaking, 
knowing  the conditions  under  which wage and price controls  would be 
nondistortionary  may be helpful  in their  actual  operation. 
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A  THEORETICAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  SYSTEM 
The  model  economy  in which  the "request-control"  system  is considered 
is characterized  by wages  and  prices that  are set and  held over some time 
period;  it is a contract  economy.  In this  economy  n products  are  produced. 
The output  of the ith product  is Qi and i =  1  ....,  n. The division  into 
products  is unorthodox:  The output  of each firm  in the economy  is con- 
sidered  to be a separate  product  and, for simplicity,  each  firm  is assumed 
to produce  only one product;  thus,  n is just equal  to the number  of firms. 
The set of products  will be divided  into three  groups:  the first  m are sold 
to final  use; the next k are capital  goods; and the last q are intermediate 
goods.  Thus,  n =  m +  k +  q. 
In the absence  of any controls,  each firm is assumed  to set the price  of 
its product  and to maintain  it for one period.  In period  t, therefore,  this 
gives  a price  vector (P): 
(17)  P(t)  =  {PIN),  ... .  Pn(t)}. 
Each  firm  is assumed  also to set the wage  it wishes  to pay  in period  t, with 
or without  explicit bargaining  with the workers.  This gives a vector of 
wages (W): 
(18)  W(t) =  {WW(t),  ..  .,  Wn(t)}. 
This formulation  implies  homogeneity  of workers,  although  it could be 
extended  to heterogeneous  workers. 
It is assumed  that wages  and  prices  are set for the same  period  and are 
not varied  within  it. In periods  t +  1, t + 2, t +3,  and  so on, new  vectors 
of wages and prices are set. Since the application  of controls  is going to 
be considered,  it is assumed  that the economy  is following  an inflationary 
path  of rising  wages  and  prices. 
Using the vector  of prices  set in any period  t, it is possible  to construct 
a price index (I(t) ).  Abstracting  from the practical  difficulties  of con- 
structing  an appropriate  index,  I assumed  weights  XR  (t), . . .,  .X1(t)40  such 
that the rate of change  of I is the measure  of inflation  relevant  for eco- 
40.  The argument  t implies that the weights are used in t, They may be based on 
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nomic policy; and its level is the appropriate  price deflator  of wage and 
profit  income  to compute  real  wages  and  profits. 
EPt(t)xi(t) 
(19)  I(t)  =  - 
1 EPiMx)i(t) 
The monetary  and fiscal policy applied to the economy  is such that, 
given  any  set of initial  conditions,  it will generate  time  paths  for the output 
of the n goods, the labor and capital  inputs  used to produce them, and 
the vectors of prices and wages. The request-control  system to reduce 
the rate of inflation  in the model economy  clearly must have some real 
consequences  (if not, it has no point). However,  conditions  will be speci- 
fied  under  which  the controls  cause  minimal  distortion. 
At the beginning  of each period, each firm  must submit  requests  for 
the price it wishes  to charge  for its product  (P)  and the wage it wishes 
to pay its labor.  The price  requests  can have any magnitude  and workers 
can continue to bargain  in setting  the firm's  wage requests.  Based upon 
the vector  of price  requests  submitted,  the price-request  index,  Ir(t), is 
n 
fi  PK(t)  i (t) 
(20)  Ir(t)  = 
n 
Pi(O)Xi(t) 
This expression  corresponds  to the price level that would obtain if the 
requests  became  the actual  prices  during  period  t. 
Suppose  policymakers  have determined  a policy goal for the level of 
the price  index  for t, which  will be denoted  Id(t).  That  goal and equation 
20 define  a scaling  factor  a (t), which  is independent  of i. 
(21)  a(t)  =  Id(t)/Ir(t). 
Vectors  of controlled  prices  and of controlled  wages  are defined  by 
(22)  P(t)  =  a(t)P  (t),  i  =  1, . ..,  n 
WJ(t) =  a1(t)Wir(t),  i =  1, . ..,  n. 
The price PC(t)  and wage WC(t) are then sent back to all firms i = 
1,...,  n, to serve as their controlled  levels. The period that was previ- 
ously a contract  period is now a control  period;  and firms  and workers 
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than the control  levels for the duration  of a control  period.  At the begin- 
ning of each new control  period,  t +  1, t + 2, t +  3, . . ., the process  is 
repeated,  aimed  at a policy-determined  path  of the desired  price  level that 
reflects  the target  rate  of inflation.  New vectors  of price  and  wage  requests 
and new vectors  of controlled  prices and wages are set each period  and, 
of course,  a series of scaling  factors  a (t +  1), a(t  + 2),  and so on. 
Provided  the wage  and  price  requests  are  all positive  and  finite,  and  that 
the controls  are  enforced,  the actual  price  level will equal  the desired  price 
level in any  period  for which  the controls  are applied: 
(23)  IC(t)  p  (O)(t)  =  a(t)  Ep((Ot)x(t)  -  d(t). 
P(O)Xi(t)  =  (t  P(O)X1(t) 
It can now be seen  how the role of worker  bargaining  for wage  requests 
is maintained,  as was stated above: The greater  the gains the workers 
obtain in  the request, the greater  the wage they finally obtain in the 
control. 
The characteristic  that the controlled  prices (and wages) be binding 
both upward and downward-hence  they are not merely price or wage 
ceilings-is  a key, distinctive,  feature  of the system  and  is essential  to the 
properties  discussed  below.4' 
The most important  property  of the controlled  wages  and  prices  is that 
the relative  wages and prices  and the real wages  imposed  by controls  are 
equal  to the relative  wage  and  price  and  the real  wage  requests  submitted. 
This property,  from equations  22 and 23, holds for any strictly  positive 
value  of a (t), the scaling  factor.  Thus, 
(24)  (a)  P,(t)/PX(t)  =  P,(t)/P(t)  for all i, j and any ae(t)  >  0 
(b) Ws(t)/Wc(t) =  W (t)/Wj(t)  for all i, j, and any ce(t) >  0 
(c)  WC(t)/Ic(t)  =  W,(t)/Ir(t)  for all i and any a(t) >  0: 
One difficulty  with applying  controls  of the usual  sort  is the huge  volume 
of information  required  to set nondistorting  wages and prices. The re- 
41.  Some suggest that it would be hard to gain acceptance  for a regulation  against 
lowering prices (over the control period)  and hard to enforce it. However, laws 
against cutting prices already exist in a number of markets, particularly in trans- 
portation. While they are widely considered undesirable, they do suggest that such 
laws are politically feasible-and  might even be feasible when they serve a more 
desirable purpose. Enforcement would be aided by the incentive rivals would have 
to complain about a firm that was cheating on its controlled price during the control 
period. But the request system need not discourage price-cutting  in general, since 
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quest-control  system  solves  this  problem:  by setting  the controls  according 
to equation  22 and enforcing  them  in both directions,  the system  extracts 
from firms  and workers  the information  the controllers  need about  rela- 
tive wages and prices. Whatever  firms  request as a relative  price or a 
relative  wage  they  get when  the  controls  are  applied. 
Making  the assumption  (discussed  further  below) that the real  interest 
rate R(t)  can be made independent  of the scaling  factor  a(t)  yields the 
next property  of the system:  the real rental  rate on capital  is independent 
of a(t)  also. To demonstrate  this proposition,  define Gh(t) as the ex- 
pected rate of change of the ratio Ph/I  for h =m  +  1, ... ., m +  k (where 
h is a capital  good). Hence G'(t)  is the expected  real capital  gain  or loss 
from holding capital good h. Now just as equation  24c followed from 
equations  21 and  22, so also does  it follow  that 
(25)  P(t)  =  I(t)  for h =  m +  1, ...,  m +  k for any a(t)  > 0.  IC(t)  Ir(t) 
As was noted, the control system is assumed  to be applied  in periods 
subsequent  to t in the same way as specified  in equations  21 and 22. If 
by setting  a(t)  =  1 for all t greater  than  some T the controls  can actually 
be removed  without  changing  equation  25, it follows that Gh(t) is inde- 
pendent  of a(t)  and the path of a in the future.  The nominal  rental  rate 
on capital  good  h(Ch) is then  given  by 
(26)  Ch(t) =  Ph(t) [R(t)  +  Dh(t)  +  Gh(t)]. 
And since  R, G', and  clearly  D,  (the rate  of physical  depreciation)  are  all 
independent of a(t),  it follows that 
(27)  Ch(t)  -  Ph(t)  {  R  +  Dh  +  Ge  -  Ch(t)  (27) 
~~Ic(t) -IC(t) 
h  r(t) ' 
The real rental  rate on capital  good h for h=m  +  1, ...,  m + k is the 
same as that implied  by the requested  prices-independent of a(t). 
The next  important  property  of the system  is that  the quantity  of output 
of the ith good, Qi, and the quantity  of labor employed  to produce  this 
output,  Ni,  that maximize  real profits,  7ri/I, are the same for the con- 
trolled  prices  and wages as for the requests-independent  of a(t). 
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Ir  -P'Qi  PqQiq  -  W,rNi  -  C-Oi} 
= Tr  for all i, for any a(t)  > O, 
where Qiq is the vector of intermediate goods purchased by firm i, Qjk is 
the vector  of capital  goods rented,  and Pq and Ck are the corresponding 
vectors  of prices  and  rental  rates.  In order  for this  result  to be correct,  real 
demand  for all firms  must also be independent  of a(t).  This is discussed 
further  below. 
Apart  from the assumptions  about  the interest  rate and demand  condi- 
tions,  the main  implications  of the system  are now clear.  Real wages,  real 
profits,  relative  prices,  and relative  wages  are all independent  of the a(t) 
chosen-in  particular,  they will be the same  for both a(t)  <  1 and a(t) 
=  1, the case of no controls;  it follows that the price and wage requests 
submitted  should  be equal  to the prices  and wages  that would  have been 
set in the absence  of controls;  and  that  the  path  of real  output  and  employ- 
ment  in all sectors should  be unchanged  by the imposition  of controls.42 
These  conclusions  are a natural  extension  of the well-known  neutrality  of 
a general-equilibrium  system  to the price  level. It was, perhaps,  not obvi- 
ous a priori that a system of requests  and controls could exploit this 
property. 
Finally,  the important  assumptions  about  the real interest  rate and real 
aggregate  demand  require  inspection. Suppose the economy is, in the 
absence  of controls,  operating  at the NAIRU with  a positive  rate of infla- 
tion. For simplicity,  suppose  that only monetary  policy can influence  the 
level of aggregate  demand.  Therefore,  in the specified  steady state the 
growth  of the money  supply  is just sufficient  to accommodate  the growth 
of the real output necessary  to maintain  the NAIRU and the positive 
rate of inflation.  In period t the controls  are imposed with a(t) <  1, so 
that the rate of inflation  is to be reduced.  What determines  the accom- 
panying  monetary  policy? Let the money stock in t be a(t)  times the 
money  stock in the absence  of controls.  Then the rate of growth  of the 
money  supply  can be set just to accommodate  the growth  of real output 
42. One of the assumptions  underlying  this result is that firms synchronously  set 
wages and prices at the beginning of each contract period even in the absence of 
controls. Of course, this is not true, and the implications of nonsynchronization  are 
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plus the rate of inflation  along the path of controlled  prices.  This initial 
adjustment  in the money supply and resetting  of its growth rate would 
approximate  the required  conditions.  However, to the extent that im- 
posing  the controls  and slowing  money  growth  would  lower the expected 
rate  of inflation  in future  periods,  the demand  for money  and  other  finan- 
cial assets  would  be raised  and  a slightly  higher  real  rate  of interest  would 
be required  for the maintenance  of equilibrium  in the asset market.  This 
should  be no surprise  since the  reduction  in the demand  for money  caused 
by expected  inflation  is emphasized  as a major  cost of inflation,  and thus 
in practice  a rise in the real  interest  rate  is desirable.  But the current  dis- 
cussion is not about the ideal policy; it is aimed at finding  conditions 
under which the imposition  of  the controls would cause the minimum 
change  in the paths  of real  variables  in the economy. 
The solution  is to invoke  fiscal  policy in order  to affect  relative  prices. 
Taxation clearly influences  the calculation of the effective  real rate of 
interest  for individual  investors.43  With  a delicate  hand  in setting  tax rates, 
therefore,  it is possible to devise a combination  of monetary  and fiscal 
policy that allows the real interest  rate, the real money stock, and hence 
(under  the simplifying  monetarist  assumption)  the path of real aggregate 
demand  to be independent  of the  path  of a(t). 
In summary,  the request-control  system  need cause little distortion  in 
this simplified  economy.  Real wages,  real profits,  relative  prices,  the real 
interest  rate, and real aggregate  demand  could be untouched  by the con- 
trols. Since aggregate  demand  and relative  prices  are unchanged,  the dis- 
tribution  of demand  by sector will also be unchanged,  as was assumed 
earlier. 
Of course, in common  with any anti-inflationary  policy, the request- 
control system,  by shifting  the price level and its rate of change,  would 
affect  debtor-creditor  relationships  and the structure  of interest  rates. It 
might  also exert  a wealth  effect  because  of the change  in the real  value  of 
government  bonds. These impacts  have been ignored;  but it is not clear 
that  they should  be considered  distortions  in any case, nor  do they  change 
the fundamental  property  that the system  allows  relative  prices  to adjust 
while  controlling  the  rate  of inflation. 
43.  Robert E.  Hall  and Dale  W. Jorgensen, "Tax Policy and Investment Be- 
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CONTROLS:  FURTHER  ANALYSIS 
The pure theory of controls outlined above rests on many strongly 
simplifying  assumptions.  To point out directions  for further  analysis,  this 
section addresses  some of the ways in which  the controls  might  function 
in a more  realistic  setting. 
In the context  of the request-control  system,  the most  important  charac- 
teristic  of the contract  economy  is that  wages  and  prices  are  set. In practice 
there  are  many  price-followers,  small  firms  that  are  not exactly  competitive 
price-takers  but whose  prices  and  wages  are  the same  as, or set in relation 
to, those of the large  firms  in their  industries.  There  are  also a number  of 
auction markets,  generally  markets  for homogeneous  raw materials  or 
foodstuffs,  where  prices  are set by supply  and demand.  And some prices, 
notably the OPEC oil price, are exogenous  for the United States, even 
though  they are not competitive  auction  prices. Therefore,  the request- 
control system  would operate  in a nonhomogeneous  economy  and, as a 
result,  would  not be applied  to all prices  and  wages,  but only to the wages 
and the value-added  prices of large firms." The demonstration  of the 
nondistorting  properties  of the request-control  system  breaks  down  when 
not all prices  are  controlled.  The key issue is the extent  to which  the com- 
bination  of controls  on the contract  sector and a monetary-fiscal  policy 
consistent  with  the desired  rate  of inflation  would  keep other  prices  in line 
with  the controlled  prices. 
Since the controlled  firms  would buy raw materials-and possibly  in- 
termediate  products-whose prices  are not controlled,  it is an important 
feature of the system that it controls  value-added  prices. Variations  in 
prices  of raw materials  would  be required  to be passed  through  to prices 
of final goods. In fact, since wages are controlled  separately,  the firms 
could simply  be required  to submit  wage and markup  requests,  which in 
the event would amount  to controlling  the value-added  price.45 
44.  The dividing line would not, therefore, be set by product. Such a division 
leads to absurdities:  unprocessed  corn is not controlled, but slightly processed corn 
is. Drawing a dividing  line according  to size is not easy either, of course;  presumably 
it would give some advantage  to small firms.  I do not find this a compelling problem. 
45.  Also, the requests  would cover the average markup  across a product line and 
the average  wage across employees or classes of employees, rather  than each product 
of a multiproduct  firm and each wage rate. 
The controls could be enforced by a system, like customs checking, of reviewing 
the accounts of a sample of firms.  All firms  would be required  to keep accounts avail- 620  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
Another important  characteristic  of the pure version of the control 
system  is that all firms  were assumed  to set new wages and new prices 
at the beginning  of each period.  The control  system  then simply  required 
that these wages and prices be submitted  as requests.  In practice, of 
course,  not all wages  and  prices  are set at the same  time.  This issue  could 
be dealt  with in part  by enforcing  greater  synchronization  of price-setting 
and in part by reducing  synchronization  within  the control  system-for 
example,  by breaking  it down  into  wage  requests  and  controls,  and  markup 
requests  and  controls. 
No serious  difficulty  would be encountered  in requiring  all large  firms 
to submit  requests  for their average  markup  every  period (for whatever 
length  is decided-say,  one or two quarters).  A firm  would not have to 
change  its request  from  one period  to the next.  Further,  specifying  that  the 
requests  all be made at the same time does not mean that the magnitude 
of a firm's  request  is kept secret  up to the last second.  To do this would 
generate  a great deal of uncertainty,  especially  in industries  marked  by 
price leadership.  Probably,  certain  key firms  would announce  their re- 
quests  slightly  in advance  of the submission  date. Other  firms  would  fol- 
low this lead,  just  as they  now do in pricing,  and  all the submissions  would 
then be made together.  Uncertainty  is also reduced  by requiring  markup 
requests.  Unexpected  increases  in the costs of inputs would not cause 
sudden  losses, for the increased  costs would be passed through  to final 
prices. 
The heart  of any system  of controls  is its ability  to hold down  wage  in- 
creases.  Here the problem  posed by synchronization  is potentially  more 
severe,  but a number  of procedures  are available  to solve it. One involves 
some compromise  with the theoretical  control system.  At the beginning 
of each period only firms  whose wages are scheduled  to rise during  that 
period are required  to submit  wage requests.46  These requests  are then 
scaled down and sent back as wage  controls.  Other  firms  simply  continue 
to pay the wages  they  have  been paying.  Since  there  will always  be a large 
number  of firms  submitting  requests  in any period,  the scaling  factor, a, 
is independent  of any single  firm's  request.  However,  under  this compro- 
able in a certain form. Much of the required  accounting  is work that is already  done, 
either for tax or internal-policy  purposes.  A firm would calculate its average  markup 
over all costs. 
46.  The period would probably be a quarter.  However, the procedure  presumes 
that most firms set annual increases-that  is, one-fourth of the controlled firns sub- 
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mise system  relative  wages  are  subject  to change.  But it should  be remem- 
bered  that any anti-inflationary  policy will cause a similar  distortion.  As 
was observed  in discussing  the simulation  model,  wages  set by multiperiod 
contracts  embody expectations  of inflation  that are then invalidated  by 
an anti-inflationary  policy. 
The final  issue is the extent  to which  the system  would  encourage  firms 
and workers  to raise their  price and wage requests  above the levels they 
would have set in the absence  of controls.  The analysis  of the previous 
section says they would not do so at all. The basic reason,  it should  be 
remembered,  is that  in the absence  of controls,  firms  and  workers  already 
set wages and prices, particularly  wages, anticipating  that inflation  will 
effectively  scale them down. Even so, one might argue that firms and 
workers  would perceive  the controls  as something  different  which they 
must  try to outwit.  As long as only a few try this strategy,  the penalty  of 
the market  will work to discourage  it, for though  they will end up with 
wages  or prices  above  their  equilibrium  relative  wages  or prices,  they will 
experience  lower  quantities  demanded  over  the control  period.  If all firms 
and  workers  try the strategy,  the desired  path of inflation  could  be main- 
tained simply  by reducing  the scaling  factor. The only serious  potential 
problem  this antidote could pose would be an increase  in inflation-a 
bounce-back-after the controls  were removed.  But four factors  suggest 
that this need not occur  with the request-control  system.  First,  monetary- 
fiscal  policy would have been coordinated  to make it consistent  with the 
rate of inflation  tracked  by controls.  Second, since there are no pent-up 
distortions  of relative prices, one of the usual motivations  for a post- 
control  spurt  of inflation  is removed.  Third,  the controls  can be gradually, 
rather  than suddenly,  removed simply  by letting  the scaling  factor tend 
to unity.  Fourth,  since the scaling  down  would  end after  the inflation  rate 
has been low and  steady  for a number  of periods,  it is hard  to see why the 
economy  would suddenly  jump off the steady-state  path it was then fol- 
lowing. 
Concluding  Remarks 
This paper  has examined  some implications  of contracts,  particularly 
wage contracts,  for macroeconomic  policy. It used a simulation  model 
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tracts may make recession less effective  in slowing inflation.  Contract 
theory  was extended  to explain,  first,  the existence  of wage contracts,  im- 
plicit or explicit, and, second, the failure  to set contract  wages so as to 
eliminate  short-run  excess supply of labor. According  to the argument 
here, when a reduction  in labor  use is simply  the (privately) optimal  re- 
sponse of a firm  and its workers  to demand  fluctuations,  labor is not in 
excess supply  in the usual  sense.  At first  inspection  the theory  behind  this 
explanation  seems  to predict  more  work-sharing  than  is observed.  A pat- 
tern of collusive  behavior  by workers  was invoked  as an explanation  of 
the predominance  of layoffs  over work-sharing. 
Finally, it was argued  that in a contract  economy of wage and price 
setting, wage and price controls  might be  suitably  applied.  A request- 
control  system  was explored,  first  at a very  theoretical  level and then  sub- 
ject to some of the modifications  necessitated  by the complexity  of the 
real economy. Comments 
and  Discussion 
William  D. Nordhaus:  Martin  Baily has prepared  a useful  and  interesting 
examination  of contract  theory  and its implications  for inflation  theory. 
My comments  will review  three  aspects: (1) the general  theoretical  ques- 
tions raised in contract  theory; (2)  the simulation  of the differential 
effects  of contracts  in recession;  and (3) the price-control  system. 
First,  contract  theory  has performed  the very  useful  function  of making 
more  rigorous  rather  vague  notions  about  how employers  are constrained 
by "morale"  or "informal  understandings."  These vague notions have 
been  invoked  whenever  the conundrum  of sticky  wages  or prices  is raised. 
There  is obvious  contract  theory  and deep contract  theory.  Obvious  con- 
tract  theory  simply  notes that there  are long-term  contracts  that  set some 
prices  and wages.  Much  of the short-run  inflexibility  of prices  and  wages, 
and  the momentum  effects  often  discovered,  simply  reflects  this  fact.  Deep 
contract  theory,  as presented  by Baily, is more subtle.  Its basic notion is 
that contracts  are  written  over what  might  be called  the economic  climate 
rather  than the economic  weather:  agreements  take into account  mainly 
the distributions  of economic variability  rather  than their realizations. 
As long as a recession  is just  a rainy  day-and  does not increase  people's 
subjective  probability  that  rainy  economic  weather  will be more  prevalent 
in the future-the  long-run  relative  valuation  of working  and swimming 
will not change. 
Although  I believe  there  is some  verisimilitude  in the phenomena  being 
described,  I have some reservations  about  the theory  insofar  as it is deep 
or "implicit"  rather  than obvious or "explicit."  If in fact the contracts 
are not legally enforceable,  why are there  not the usual powerful  incen- 
tives to shade  them on the part  of the individual  firms?  Why  is "contract 
shading"-cheating  a little on the implicit  contract-any more implaus- 
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ible than wage or price shading?  Is the rationale  that people don't  shade 
wages  because  of implicit  contracts  somewhat  circular  for this reason? 
Another set of problems  with the contractual  theories  is that they do 
not answer the fundamental  question: why do explicit contracts  cover 
three years for labor in the United States,  a lifetime  for labor in Japan, 
and zero for auction  goods?  Why  is oil a customer  good, while copper  is 
not? I have a suspicion  that the contract  theorists  focus on the wrong 
phenomenon-or at least overemphasize  the point-when they argue  that 
the purpose of the contract  is to reduce uncertainty,  reflecting  worker 
risk aversion  vis-a-vis  wage changes.  It seems more probable  to me that 
the existence  or length of a contract  depends  just as much on the trans- 
actions  costs of arriving  at a bargain,  of spelling  out all the contingencies 
in the contingent  contract.  If the fundamental  reason  for long-term  con- 
tracts  is to reduce  these transactions  costs, many  of the implications  that 
Baily draws  for the cyclical  behavior  of wages and employment  are less 
plainly  applicable.  The cyclical  sensitivity  of wages  and  prices  may  lessen, 
as in obvious contract  theory, simply because the response is slower. 
Whether  any additional  long-run  stickiness  is attributable  to this source 
is unclear.  I personally  am not convinced  that  the differential  diagnosis  of 
implicit  contract  theory  for explaining  the stickiness  of wages and  prices 
or the  persistence  of unemployment  is proven. 
Next, I wish to discuss  the simulation  exercise  in the first  part of the 
paper.  Baily has asked  a number  of interesting  questions  about  the opera- 
tion of Tobin's  labor-market  simulation  model. The model shows a nat- 
ural  rate  of unemployment  (or a NAIRU) in that  it is inflation-neutral- 
all real variables  will operate  at the same  level for any given  rate of infla- 
tion to which the system  has completely  adapted.  Two results  emerging 
from the model were at least a little surprising  to me. First, the natural 
rate  appears  to be less constant  than  the speed  of light-although perhaps 
not so whimsical  as the velocity of money over the last couple of years. 
It is clearly quite different  with different  contract  specifications,  with a 
lower natural  rate associated  with the very quick adjustment  of no con- 
tracts,  and a higher  natural  rate associated  with the very  slow adjustment 
of long contracts.  I presume  that longer contracts  would provide  more 
smoothing,  thereby  removing  some of the inflationary  influence  of the 
nonlinearities  in the system,  and lead to a lower natural  rate. This is not 
so in Baily's simulation.  Why? Because the wage rate responds  to the 
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amplifying,  rather  than averaging,  the noise. Presumably,  if the noise is 
at the red  rather  than  the violet end of the spectrum,  long contracts  should 
do more smoothing,  taking an average  of past unemployment  rates in 
setting  wage demands.  From a couple of simple scratchings,  I have not 
convinced  myself  whether  or not this  would  reverse  the Baily  result. 
The simulation  results in table 1 also show two effects, one not sur- 
prising, and one terribly  surprising.  The unsurprising  result is that the 
short-run  response  of inflation  to unemployment  is much  smaller  with  the 
friction  of contracts  imposed  upon  it. The surprising  point  is that  the long- 
run response  is also smaller  in the contract  system:  put differently,  long 
contracts  delay the response  not only for a while but forever. 
This is not obvious.  It is easy to see why it cannot  be due simply  to the 
existence  of a longer  lag of wages  behind  unemployment  when there  are 
price responses.  In a simple  linear  system  in which contracts  simply  lag 
excess  demand  by a fixed  period,  wages  are  passed  through  into prices: 
1'Vt =  aXt.o  +  Wt-l, 
where  a period  is the time it takes for prices  to respond  to wages, and 0 
is the average  contract  period.  Clearly,  then, 
t  =  aXt-e. 
Thus the length  of the lag shows  up not in the long-run  response  of wages 
to demand,  but only in the speed of adjustment. 
Why does the Baily simulation  not show the same properties?  He 
ran the simulation  for 120 periods, and doing so did not change the 
shape  of the results.  Nor do nonlinearities.  Pretty  clearly,  the wage equa- 
tion has changed  in a subtle  way: In programming  the change  in wages 
for a multiperiod  contract, the wage deceleration  arising from excess 
supply  takes  place only in the first  period.  Thus,  if the theory  is, say, that 
a one-point  increase  in unemployment  over the natural  rate  for one year 
lowers  the rate of wage inflation  by one point, I would  have guessed  that 
wage  deceleration  would  continue  over  the  length  of multiperiod  contracts; 
but  Baily  applies  it only  to the  first  period. 
A simple example  will make this clear. Assume that there is a one- 
period  recession  in period 1, all wages rising  at 10 percent  annually.  In 
a noncontract  world, suppose that all wages and therefore  the average 
will rise at 9 percent  annually  after  the recession.  Next consider  a case of 
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industry  that  renegotiates  in period  1 wvill  wages  be affected  in that  period. 
I would  have thought  that  the logic would call for its wages  to decelerate 
at 1 percent  per annum  for both  periods,  or to rise by 9, and then 8 per- 
cent annually  over the two years of the contract.  In that event, the long 
run  is exactly  the same as it is in the no-contract  system.  In Baily's  simu- 
lation, however, the inflationary  process in the contract world never 
catches up because the full contract  or "life cycle" response of wages, 
measured  as the deceleration  in percent  per annum  for a given  change  in 
unemployment,  is assumed  to be inversely  proportional  to the contract 
length.  As this  is not especially  plausible,  I take  the results  to be an inter- 
esting  feature  of the model, but not necessarily  an interesting  feature  of 
the real  world. 
One intriguing  issue that is raised but not pursued  involves rational 
expectations.  It would be very useful to know whether  perfect  foresight 
about  the systematic  noise  in the economy  (either  the  persistence  in excess 
demand  in a particular  industry  or the prevailing  macroeconomic  wester- 
lies) would  lead to a markedly  different  structure.  To the extent  that  local 
turbulence  is more  important  than  the prevailing  winds,  I suspect  that  the 
results  would not be a twig-like  Keynesian  structure  easily blown down 
by the  big  bad  monetarist  wolf. 
Finally,  I would like to address  the "request-control  system."  It seems 
to me that  Baily  has set forth  a system  of price  controls  obeying  the  funda- 
mental axiom of a well-designed  incomes policy: that to be politically 
successful,  it must be distributionally  neutral.  An incomes  policy is like 
an attempt  to get everybody  at a football  game  to sit down  at an exciting 
moment-when  the situation  is overheated,  so to speak: if everybody 
sits down people can see better  and will be a lot more comfortable.  The 
elegance  of Baily's scheme  is that inflation  is reduced  by making  every- 
one sit down-not  just one's  least favorite  steel company  or labor  union. 
This having  been said, it is also clear that such a scheme  is both theo- 
retically  and practically  impossible.  It is theoretically  impossible  because 
there  is always  one nominal  price that cannot  be reduced-the  nominal 
rate  on money.  On a practical  level, Baily  himself  notes  many  of the prob- 
lems. The basic difficulty is that the scheme forces firms to announce rela- 
tive prices and, what is more important,  to stick to them.  This will work 
in the Arrow-Debreu  world  of perfect  futures  and  insurance  markets  clear- 
ing now for all time to come (although  why inflation  is a serious  problem 
in such a world  is a bit of a puzzle). In that  world,  it would  be possible  to Martin  Neil Baily  627 
redefine  the units to ensure  a constant  price level in all periods,  without 
adding any uncertainty at all to firms'  decisions. If, however, firms' prices 
or quantities  are uncertain,  as in 99 percent  of the world as we know it, 
then forcing  a firm  or household  to announce  a fixed  real plan before  the 
uncertainties  are resolved  generally  results  in a deterioration  of a firm's 
ex ante  profits  or a household's  ex ante  utilities.  Thus  the more  that  firms 
are  faced  with  market  uncertainties  that  might  lead  them  to change  relative 
prices  within  the control  period,  the more  the request-control  system  will 
pinch them. Nevertheless,  as a stylized view of what a control system 
should  do-as  opposed  to how it will be done-Baily's model  looks ideal. 
Christopher  A. Sims:  The "new  contract  theory"  that  Baily helped  to de- 
velop has yielded  valuable  insights,  particularly  into the question  of why 
some prices  tend to be rigid  even in the face of substantial  quantity  fluc- 
tuations.  This theory  is, however,  very  much a partial-equilibrium  theory 
at its present  stage  of development,  and  in trying  to use it, as in this  paper, 
to generate  macroeconomic  conclusions,  Baily has, in my view, put more 
weight  on this  fragile  new apparatus  than  it can  bear. 
The theory  described  in the paper  applies  to a single employer  and is 
static. There is no explanation  of how prices and wages interact  in an 
economy  in which  implicit  and  explicit  contracts  link  many  kinds  of buyers 
and sellers.  There  is no explanation  of how contract  length  is determined, 
or of just how the need to maintain  a "reputation"  allows implicit  con- 
tracts  to work  without  frequent  default.  These aspects  of reality,  taken  as 
given in the new contract  theory,  are critical  to macroeconomic  applica- 
tions. 
Baily has presented  a simulation  model that seems to imply, for ex- 
ample,  that  mandating  renegotiation  of wage  contracts  at annual  intervals 
would  substantially  reduce  the unemployment  fluctuations  needed  to con- 
trol  inflation.  But  because  the simulation  model  does  not  generate  contracts 
endogenously,  one cannot measure  the welfare  losses that such a man- 
dated form for contracts  would evidently  impose. Further,  it should be 
apparent  that every important  part of the dynamics  of the model would 
be affected  by mandated  changes  in contract  length. To the extent that 
sectoral labor-market  conditions become less persistent as  contracts 
shorten,  the returns  to workers  from switching  sectors  decrease.  To the 
extent  that  fluctations  in aggregate  unemployment  become  less persistent, 
the response  of the wage to aggregate  demand  might  decrease.  (That the 628  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
model  allows  no direct  effect  of aggregate unemployment  on sectoral  wage 
settlements  is an evident  defect.) To the extent that wages become less 
stable,  the reaction  of prices  to wages  would  probably  become  more  slug- 
gish.  This  list could  go on. 
The conclusion  that  shorter  contracts  are  likely to make  inflation  more 
sensitive  to aggregate  demand,  at least in the short  run, seems plausible 
to me. But if we were to try to get this model to do more than act as a 
ventriloquist's  dummy,  and instead,  to predict  realistically  the size of the 
effect  and the possible  side effects,  the number  of modifications  and  sensi- 
tivity tests required  would be prohibitive.  The dummy  would begin to 
behave  like a tar  baby. 
The scheme  of price controls  Baily proposes  appears  to me to offer  no 
real advantage  over methods  that  have been used in the past. The osten- 
sible advantage  is that firms  and workers  can be allowed  to set prices  in 
nominal  terms,  and the control  authority  can then choose a single  aggre- 
gate scaling  parameter-a in Baily's  notation.  Such a mechanism  appar- 
ently forestalls  the tremendous  load of microeconomic  decisionmaking 
generally  regarded  as necessary  to control  aggregate  price levels without 
distorting  relative  prices as allocational  tools. However, crucial  to this 
scheme  is the condition  that firms  and workers  will have no incentive  to 
second-guess  the aggregate  scale parameter.  For three  reasons  this condi- 
tion does not hold in practice.  First, if not all prices and wages are set 
synchronously,  firms  and workers  will be concerned  about  their  competi- 
tive position  relative  to others  whose prices  will remain  fixed. Second,  if 
"auction  market"  prices are left uncontrolled,  firms  will be concerned 
about  their  positions  relative  to them. (The passthrough  of costs suggested 
by Baily does not solve this problem,  since auction-market  commodities 
may  be substitutes  for, as well as inputs  into, contract-price  goods.) Third, 
firms  will second-guess  -a because of suspicions  that aggregate-demand 
management  will fail exactly  to validate  the controls.  To these problems 
add the need to verify "value-added  price"  accounting.  The conclusion 
must  be that, in practice,  the system  would  have to deal with requests  for 
nominal-price  changes on a case-by-case  basis, just as control systems 
always  have. 
Finally,  I think  Baily makes  too much  of the effect  on the new contract 
analysis  of the introduction  of flexible  hours.  His own analysis  does make 
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variable  hours  under  a very special  form  of utility  function  in income  and 
leisure.  The  form  he chooses-linear in income  and  additively  separable- 
implies that the dollar  value of an hour of leisure  to a worker  can vary 
widely  while  the marginal  utility  of income  is held constant.  If utility  func- 
tions concave  in both income and leisure, and not additively  separable, 
are admitted,  one cani  find solutions  in which  neither  hours  nor the wage 
vary much  with the state of the world  but layoffs  occur.  The conditions 
on the utility  function  required  to produce  this result  are a priori  no more 
implausible  to me than Baily's assumptions.  Before throwing  out what 
appears  to me to be a basic  insight  of the new contract  theory-that wage 
arrangements  probably  involve  a natural  form  of insurance  by employers 
of employees-I  think the implications  of the two sets of restrictions  on 
utility  functions  ought  to be put  to a test. 
This point is relevant  to Baily's  discussion  of the importance  of collu- 
sion in explaining  layoffs,  since a good part of the weight  Baily attaches 
to collusive effects depends  on his judgment  that without collusion the 
limited  observed  variations  in hours  are hard  to explain.  Besides  the fact 
that I don't  share  that  judgment,  I have some difficulty  with  Baily's  argu- 
ment as to why collusion  should  tend to make  layoffs  more  likely.  Unless 
group  A workers  and group  B workers  prefer layoffs  to hours  reductions, 
there  is no reason a collusive  contract  could not provide  for variation  in 
hours.  Baily claims  that variations  in hours  give the employer  incentives 
to default  on the expected  earnings  differential  between  groups  A and B. 
His reasoning  appears  to me to rest  on an assumption  that  either  the  work- 
week or wages must  be the same for all workers.  I think  that a contract 
that,  for example,  simply  specified  that  all reductions  in labor  input  would 
first  affect  group  B workers,  whether  through  layoffs  or reductions  in the 
workweek,  would  avoid  the kind of default  incentive  that  concerns  Baily. 
The fact that less senior  workers  are commonly  laid off in slack periods 
rather  than put on short  weeks  must  be explained  by worker  preferences 
or technology,  not  by the  presence  or absence  of collusion. 
Martin  Neil Bally: Christopher  Sims  is certainly  right  in pointing  out the 
many limitations  of contract  theory.  I cannot explain just how implicit 
contracts  work,  or why explicit  contracts  take  just  the form  they  do. But I 
do believe that these contracts  are an important  phenomenon  and that I 
can appraise  some of their  effects-even  though  I can't  account  for their 630  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
precise  character.  It is clear  that  firms  do care about  their  reputations  as 
employers,  and that  that  concern  influences  their  behavior. 
I cannot  understand  the  basis  for  Nordhaus'  assumption  that,  when  con- 
tracts are negotiated,  the state of the labor market  determines  a rate of 
deceleration  in annual  wage  increases,  rather  than  an ongoing  rate  of wage 
increase.  I don't  believe that actual  contracts  embody  the deceleration  to 
which  Nordhaus  attributes  compelling  logic. 
I can accept Sims'  reservations  about the application  of partial-equi- 
librium  microanalysis  to macroeconomic  problems.  But I don't like any 
of the alternatives  either.  In particular,  the simple  extrapolation  of aggre- 
gate relationships  has often led us astray.  One memorable  example  is the 
huge error  made thirty  years ago in predicting  the postwar  consumption 
function  from the time-series  data of the interwar  period.  Another  is the 
extrapolation  into the seventies  of the previous  stability  of the macro- 
economic relationship  expressed  by the Phillips curve. Clearly,  neither 
aggregate  nor microeconomic  relationships  give perfect  answers;  but used 
carefully,  both can  yield  evidence  on the  puzzles  that  confront  economists. 
On the control  scheme,  I want to emphasize  that I intended  to offer a 
theoretical  investigation  of the conditions  under which wage and price 
controls  would  function  optimally-without creating  distributional  or allo- 
cational  distortions.  I did not present  the model as a practical  proposal 
for current  implementation.  But I do feel that  some  of the criticisms  make 
the model sound more unrealistic  than it is. For example,  I believe that 
second-guessing  the scaling parameter  has been overemphasized  by the 
discussants  as a limitation  on the relevance  of the model.  If any firm  tries 
to second-guess  a, it can suffer  a market  penalty  by ending  up with a rela- 
tive price that is too high or too low. The virtue  of the system  lies in its 
enabling  the market  to continue  to work.  Nordhaus  exaggerates  the dis- 
location that would be caused  by requiring  fixed average  markups  from 
large corporations  for three to six months. As they operate  now, these 
firms  reset prices  only occasionally.  The control  system  would surely  not 
require  Arrow-Debreu  futures  markets.  On the contrary,  its strength  is its 
flexibility. 
On one final  point raised  by Sims,  I clearly  could  alter  the labor-leisure 
utility function and account  for layoffs without  invoking  collusion.  But 
in that case I would really say, in one sense or another,  that people get 
laid off because  they  like to watch  TV or take  vacations:  that  explanation 
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Discussion 
Robert  Hall, Michael  Wachter,  and Charles  Holt all agreed  that con- 
tract  theory  was a very positive  development.  Hall, however,  pointed  to 
a number  of loose ends  in the current  theory.  One of these  concerns  is the 
way  wages  are  set at contract  time.  Is it just  the workers  who happen  to be 
employed  in the firm  at the time  of the contract  whose  wishes  are  reflected 
in the bargaining?  Or are laid-off  workers  represented  in some fashion 
when the contract  is negotiated?  Second, he called for an answer  to a 
recent  critique  of contract  theory  offered  by Robert  Barro.  Barro  argues 
that, if the purpose  of the contract  is to ensure  ex post equality  between 
the marginal  product  of labor and the marginal  value of workers'  time, 
a purely  monetary  disturbance  should  have  no real  effects,  since  it changes 
both of these  factors  by the same  proportion.  In that sense,  Barro  argues, 
contract  theory  does not explain  why the short-run  Phillips  curve  is not 
vertical. 
Franco Modigliani  observed  that a monetarist,  rational-expectations 
formulation  would imply that the real effects  from contracts  could not 
extend beyond the horizon of the longest outstanding  contract.  Baily's 
results  attribute  an enduring  effect  to contracts  because  of the backward- 
looking price term in equation  8. Modigliani  agreed  strongly  with Baily 
that  past prices  are a determinant  of wages.  He felt that  people  do in fact 
look backward,  and  that  catching-up  aspirations  add  to the momentum  of 
the inflationary  process.  The man in the street  looks to the past because 
he has no firm  idea about the future.  Agreeing  with Modigliani,  Arthur 
Okun  distinguished  between  adaptive  expectations  and  adaptive  behavior. 
Because  people  recognize  that  they  cannot  forecast  well,  they  adopt  a prac- 
tice of seeking  compensation  for what  happened  in the past;  and  that  prac- 
tice works out reasonably  well because of the long-lasting  attachments 
that  mark  a contract  world. 
Several  participants  expressed  doubts  that Baily's  collusive  model was 
necessary  to explain  either  the prevalence  of layoffs (rather  than work- 
sharing  or wage-cutting)  in recession  or the seniority-related  nature  of 
layoffs. Wachter  suggested  that the observed  phenomena  could be ex- 
plained  without  invoking  collusion  by a life-cycle  model  with sorting  and 
specific  training.  William  Poole elaborated  on the life-cycle aspects, ar- 
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ers, who have greater  responsibilities  than do younger  people. Holt felt, 
however,  that younger  people might  have greater  burdens  since they had 
to make  heavier  investments  in durable  goods  and  had  maximum  mortgage 
commitments.  Poole responded that, if  seniority-related  layoffs were 
merely  the result of collusion,  new firms  could find it profitable  to offer 
employees  a pledge that the hours of all workers  would be reduced  by 
the same  proportion  whenever  employment  had to be contracted.  Finally, 
he suggested  that  commuting  costs might  be one element  in the real  world 
that  argued  against  shortened  workdays.  Hall noted  that,  when  a firm  shut 
down  for a full week,  it was not making  seniority-related  layoffs.  Yet that 
kind of work-sharing  showed up as layoffs in the data rather  than as a 
shorter  workweek. 
Agreeing  with  Sims'  comments  on the special  properties  of Baily's  utility 
function  involving  leisure, Okun pointed out that, according  to Baily's 
function,  people  would  take  time  off exclusively  in shorter  workweeks  and 
never in full-week  vacations.  He suggested  that any utility  function  that 
accounted  for vacations  would also account  for layoffs.  Martin  Feldstein 
agreed  that  utility  functions  that  implied  a disutility  of a lumpy  sort asso- 
ciated  with working  would  be enough  to account  for some layoffs-apart 
from collusion, unemployment-insurance  effects, or anything  else. But 
Feldstein  expressed  his preference  for an explanation  of layoffs (rather 
than wage cuts) that relied  on asymmetry  of information  about demand 
conditions  between  firms  and employees.  Workers  would be skeptical  if 
a firm  informed  them  that it was cutting  wages  because  demand  had col- 
lapsed;  but when  the firm  reduces  employment  and  production,  the work- 
ers  know  that  it is telling  the  truth. 
There  was some discussion  of what role the unemployment-insurance 
system  might  play in exacerbating  layoffs.  Okun  pointed  to the figures  for 
1929-32 cited in Baily's footnote 27 as a clear demonstration  that the 
basic predominance  of layoffs over shorter  workweeks  could not be at- 
tributed  to either  unemployment  insurance,  which  was nonexistent  at the 
time, or to unions, which then were extremely  weak in manufacturing. 
Stephen  Marston  applied  the argument  to current  conditions;  he reported 
that only 8 percent  of all firms  are at their  maximum  unemployment  tax 
rate,  and 26 percent  are at the minimum;  thus,  two-thirds  of all firms  face 
continuously  increasing  taxes if they lay off workers.  Feldstein,  however, 
cautioned  that even for those firms  the tax exemption  of unemployment- 
insurance  benefits  provides  an incentive  for layoffs;  and he suggested  that Martin  Neil Baily  633 
the marginal  tax rate is about 30 percent  for average  workers.  Feldstein 
also cited  a study  by Joseph  Becker  that  found  that  in several  states  work- 
ers laid off by firms  at their  maximum  unemployment  tax rate accounted 
for half  of all  benefits. 
While  accepting  Baily's  description  of his price-wage  control  scheme  as 
a model of an ideal system,  several  participants  wished  to emphasize  how 
far that ideal was from the real world.  Wachter  stressed  that,  because  of 
the existence  of nonsynchronized  long-lasting  contracts,  the initiation  of 
any  controls  system  would  inevitably  disturb  income  shares  and  could  not 
meet  the requirement  of distributional  or allocative  neutrality.  Hall argued 
that the Baily plan involved greater  administrative  complexity  than did 
the 1971-73 controls  in one important  respect;  in the actual  control  sys- 
tem, only exceptional  price increases  had to be submitted,  while Baily's 
scheme  required  all price actions  to be ratified.  Hall also expressed  his 
reservations  about any plan that enforced  downward  as well as upward 
price  rigidity-an essential  feature  of Baily's  system.  Poole and  Feldstein 
felt that firms  would  have to second-guess  their  rivals'  decisions  and that 
the plan would  thus entail  tremendous  uncertainties  for firms  and induce 
complex  price-setting  strategies. 
Martin  Baily  responded  to several  points  raised  in the  general  discussion. 
He rejected  the distinction  between  monetary  and  real disturbances  made 
in the Barro analysis  that Hall had cited;  he stated  that contract  theory 
deals with the responses  of firms  and workers  to disturbances  perceived 
by them as real. He also defended  his disutility-of-work  function,  arguing 
that  if the time period  is viewed  as a quarter  rather  than  a week,  the func- 
tion  is compatible  with  a desire  for  vacations.  He acknowledged  that  short- 
term plant closings, such as Hall had mentioned,  should then be inter- 
preted  as work-sharing  (like hours  reduction);  but  the  rarity  of widespread 
job rotation  (one week  off, two weeks  on) remained  a mystery  unless  col- 
lusion was present.  Furthermore,  he cautioned  against  putting  too much 
weight  on the value  of leisure  in a theory  of recession  layoffs. 
In reply  to Hall's doubts  about  restricting  price  reductions  through  the 
control system,  Baily noted that prices could fall between  request  dates 
when  costs of raw  materials  fall, and  markups  could  be reduced  by means 
of new, lower, requests.  Allowing firms to preannounce  their requests 
would eliminate  some of the uncertainty  that concerned  Poole and Feld- 
stein. Finally, Baily emphasized  that the uncertainty  caused  by controls 
should  be balanced  against  the  uncertainty  caused  by recession. 